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Immediately after the “Arab Spring”, many were intrigued by the question of 
why scholars failed to predict the rising popular movements that toppled some of the 
long-standing dictators in the Arab region. Much literature has been focusing on the 
transformation that took place in Arab republics, especially Egypt and Tunisia, where 
Islamists rose to power; yet survival of monarchies seems to be taking much less 
attention than that of the republics. Some believe the answer to why monarchies 
survived is straightforward, and that is due to the oil revenues that Gulf States use to 
buy off people’s political voices and personal freedoms. But what about the other two 
Arab monarchies that do not have the same oil assets and revenues as the Gulf States?   
Although it is interesting to examine why revolutions took place in the 
republics and in a manner that surprised even the most specialized Middle Eastern 
scholars, it is as important to study why there was a lack of regime change in 
Monarchies, especially those that lack the financial means to compensate their people.  
Being personally interested in monarchies and coming from a non-oil-
producing country myself, I want to explore the mechanisms of control by which 
King Abdullah II appeased his people and to also situate Jordan’s experience in a 
comparative perspective. It is also important to distinguish whether the revolutionary 
wave was limited from spreading in Jordan and Morocco by the regime itself, or 
whether the majority of the people really believe in the legitimacy or right of the 
regime to rule. The decision to study Morocco alongside Jordan is to compare those 
control mechanisms in what appears to be states that fall under the same category, but 
in a different sub-region and influenced by a different colonial experience. Do the 
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Jordanian and Moroccan people not have the same demands for freedom and social 
equality as the rest of the Arabs living in the republics? Are their voices silenced due 
to respectful obedience for the ruler or due to fear of regime repression? Or will 
research show that the answer is a combination of both, respectful obedience for the 
rulers by a segment of society with regime repression on other groups within those 
two societies?    
The objective of this research is to clarify some of these questions and attempt 
to answer why the public reacted differently in those two countries than in other Arab 
republics and monarchies. Furthermore, this research is to examine whether it was the 
regime action or public reaction that curbed the growth of revolutionary movements 
in both Jordan and Morocco.   
The organizational structure of the chapters is consistent with building up a 
cohesive argument leading to the final and most important chapter containing the 
synthesis of the thesis. Chapter II begins with the examination of the historical 
backgrounds of the monarchies, their state formation period and leadership over the 
years, where features of regime domination prior to the “Arab Spring” are 
highlighted. Chapter III studies the manner in which Islamist parties function under 
authoritarian rule, their organizational structures and their interaction with formal and 
informal politics.  Chapter IV applies Heydemann’s authoritarian upgrading model on 
the two monarchies, with specific reference to the political, economic and societal 
situations in both and the approach that the monarchs handled significant backdrops 
post “Arab Spring”, specifically their complicated economic dilemmas. Chapter V, 
the most significant chapter of all holds the results of the research, and future 




The wave of popular uprisings that began in 2011 across the Arab world, also 
known as the “Arab Spring”, managed to topple four of the long standing dictators in 
the region, namely in Libya, Egypt, Yemen and Tunisia. This of course rooted fear in 
Arab authoritarian Monarchs, pushing some to resort to financial resources to silence 
their people, others sought military help from neighboring countries to suppress 
popular uprisings, while still others introduced some political reforms. This leaves us 
with a very important question; is it really good to be king in the “Arab Spring” era, 
how and why? 
Jordan and Morocco are the only two Arab non-oil-producing Kingdoms that 
lack the financial resources to pay off their people’s silence; how then are they still 
surviving till this moment? In Morocco, King Mohammad VI holds the title 
Commander of the Faithful and in Jordan, King Abdullah II capitalizes on the claim 
of a direct descendant of Prophet Mohammad. Religious legitimacy is only one of the 
foundation pillars for the rule of both monarchs; however, it had gained them respect 
and obedience from their people.  
This research analyzes the foundational state elements within the non-oil- 
producing monarchies and draws on reasons behind their survival from the 
revolutionary wave that swept the Arab region. This research will look in depth at the 
alternative options offered and means used by the monarchs of Jordan and Morocco in 
exchange for the people’s political allegiance. The focus of this thesis is to understand 
how mass uprisings are prevented from taking place and how they are managed once 
they are taken to the streets. 
Emphasis on the common argument of regime repression for survival does not 
stand on its own because suppression levels were not as severe in Morocco and 
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Jordan, as their neighboring republics for example, and besides regime attitude pre 
and post “Arab Spring” did not transform acutely proving the invalidity of this 
argument1. The thesis will examine the strategies adopted by similar monarchs as a 
reaction to their Islamist opposition, especially with the inclusion of Islamists in 
Morocco’s political system and the exclusion of the same group from Jordanian 
political life. 
It is important to note that this thesis is not trying to prove a macro-level 
continuity in the survival of monarchies; on the contrary, it is arguing that there are 
shifting strategies and mechanisms on the micro level that are helping monarchies 
defy these currents of change.  
 
Hypothesis: 
Survival of non-oil-producing monarchies is a function of their own 
traditional legitimacy and the softening of their authoritarian regimes. 
The Moroccan King plays on the card of religious legitimacy; however, after 
the “Arab Spring” he was also capable of drawing on political legitimacy through 
introducing constitutional reforms that limited to some extent his powers. The 
Jordanian King similarly has been claiming religious and tribal legitimacy, whether 
before or after the “Arab Spring”. Although at the face level it seemed like King 
Abdullah II was introducing actual reforms for free and fair elections, he still 
depended on religious and tribal support for his position.   
Traditional legitimacy, whether religious or tribal, and action-based 
legitimacy, or the legitimacy gained by the regime on basis of its ability to offer 
reform and provide services to the people, have both helped in the survival of the 
 
11 Holger Albrecht and Oliver Schlumberger, “’Waiting for Godot’: Regime Changes Without 
Democratization in the Middle East,” International Political Science Review 371-392 25(2004): 385.  
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monarchies in Jordan and Morocco. This paper claims that legitimacy in all its above 
mentioned forms, coupled with full regime control over state institutions and state 
security pressure on the Moroccan and Jordanian public have all played a major role 
in the resilience of those monarchies.    
 Exploring the reactions of the different monarchies towards Arab uprisings is 
important to understand how these demands were perceived by the states and what the 
mechanisms of dealing with the people were, whether through political reform, wealth 
or coercion. However, this thesis will only focus on the reaction of the Jordanian and 



















CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK AND LITERATURE REVIEW  
Conceptual Framework: 
Definitions: 
Non-oil-producing monarchies have survived the Arab revolutions so far. As 
both Morocco and Jordan are not the typical “Bakhshish states”2, this only leaves 
space for legitimacy to be one of the anchors holding both monarchs in place. The 
conceptual framework of this thesis focuses on the idea of legitimacy in its various 
forms. Legitimacy could be legally based and either achieved through religious 
claims, tribal support, or state achievements, or as a varied combination.  
The last part of this section clarifies the definitions that will be utilized in this 
thesis. The operational definition of legitimacy is based on the thoughts of Max 
Weber, who has focused in depth on classifying the types of authority and the 
conditions under which each applies. Max Weber’s Theory of Social and Economic 
Organization points out to three different types of authority and discusses their 
relation to legitimacy.  Weber’s breakdown of types of authority includes those 
resting on rational grounds, others on traditional grounds and still others on 
charismatic grounds3. 
The conceptual lens of this thesis focuses on the second type of legitimate 
authority, the one based on traditional grounds. Weber emphasizes that this type rests 
“on an established belief in the ‘legality’ of patterns of normative rules and the right 
of those elevated to authority under such rules to issue commands (legal authority)4. 
Legitimate authority based on traditional grounds set the guidelines by which ruler 
 
2 Bahgat Korany, “Arab Democratization: A Poor Cousin?” Political Science and Politics 511-514 
27(3): 1994, 511. 
3 Max Weber, The Theory of Social and Economic Organization tr. by A.M. Henderson and Talcott 
Parsons; ed.Talcott Parsons. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1947), 328. 
4 Ibid, 328. 
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and ruled interact, making sure there is a certain mode of loyalty present that is 
directly relates to the person in power himself. The significance of Weber’s 
interpretation of the traditional authority lies in the attitude associated with subjects’ 
loyalty, where “the obligation of obedience…is a matter of personal loyalty within 
the area of accustomed obligations”5. Emphasis is placed on the notion of personal 
allegiance, and this type of legitimacy is difficult to question because it symbolizes a 
relation based on choice and faith in the person of the ruler. 
 We can deduce from the above a more simplified definition of Weber’s 
legitimacy, which emphasizes notions of power, obedience and domination; that is, 
“to exclusively base a political regime on interests or violence tends to create 
instability, while the regime becomes stable if it is seen as valid or binding”6. The 
traditional grounds of legitimate authority is also complimented by Philip Khoury’s 
and Joseph Kostiner’s outlook on the concept; “legitimacy implies myths and symbols 
which provide a kind of ideological rationalization and justification for this monopoly 
of coercive authority”7.  
Furthermore, this thesis rests upon the idea of dual causation, which infers that 
a couple of elements have caused the resilience of these monarchies. In addition to 
traditional legitimacy (religious and/or tribal), the second conceptual element is the 
idea of “upgraded authoritarianism”. Upgrading authoritarianism, or the softening of 
authoritarianism, focuses on the process of shifting from traditional authoritarianism 
in the Arab world, to becoming a more flexible system, with potential for limited 
liberalization under state control. 
 
5 Ibid, 328. 
6 Richard Swedberg, The Max Weber Dictionary: Key Words and Central Concepts (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 2005), 148. 
7 Philip Khoury and Joseph Kostiner, Tribes and State Formation in the Middle East (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1990), 3. 
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The other concept to define is the system of upgrading authoritarianism, or the 
process as a whole, which “involves reconfiguring authoritarian governance to 
accommodate and manage changing political, economic, and social conditions”8. It 
evolves into a type of hybrid regime that is neither fully authoritarian in nature, nor 
absolutely democratic. The merging of the two concepts, legitimacy and authoritarian 
upgrading, have produced a system that has been helping monarchies cope with the 
political, social and economic challenges that have increased since the “Arab Spring”. 
Although the focus of this thesis is not the type of regime generated from 
authoritarian upgrading, it is still significant to place Morocco and Jordan in such a 
classification. The non-oil producing monarchies fall into the category of hybrid 
regimes that are represented through the limited democracy model, 
“There is universal suffrage, a formally correct electoral procedure, elective posts 
occupied on the basis of elections and a multi-party system…there is no effective 
political opposition and, above all, the media compromised by a situation of 
monopoly to the point that part of the population is effectively prevented from 
exercising their rights”.9 
 
This model’s representation of Morocco and Jordan heavily depends on the idea that 
in both countries, the limitations placed on the citizens’ exercise of basic rights is still 
absent, although there are signs of liberalization through “democratic” institutions and 
newly announced policies. 
 
Methodology: 
There is no absolute grading system that could measure the degree of 
authoritarianism; however, there are certain indicators that show to what extent there 
was a shift from traditional authoritarianism to a new form of hybrid regime. 
 
8 Steven Heydemann, “Upgrading Authoritarianism in the Arab World”, The Saban Center for Middle 
East Policy at the Brookings Institution 1-39. 2007:1. 
9 Leonardo Morlino, “Are there Hybrid Regimes? Or are they Just an Optical Illusion?” European 
Political Science Review 273-296 1(2009): 287.  
 9 
Heydemann proposes in his paper on authoritarian upgrading that there are five 
features of this phenomenon, and he confirms that they are present in both Jordan and 
Morocco. The five points listed by Heydemann are: “1.appropriating and containing 
civil societies, 2. managing political contestation, 3. capturing the benefits of selective 
economic reforms, 4. controlling new communication technologies, 5. diversifying 
international linkages”10.  
 By examining each feature and its implementation in either Jordan or 
Morocco, this thesis will try to draw a comparison between each of the two countries, 
to see where they are heading on the authoritarian upgrading ladder. Although no 
specific grading scale will be produced at the end of the research, studying the above 
mentioned features will make it easier to relatively measure the degree of 
authoritarianism and its evolution between Jordan and Morocco.  
The type and impact of civil society groups, the space given for opposition to 
maneuver, the influence of reform whether political or economic, the surveillance of 
new technologies and the type of relations that the monarchies share with key groups 
within their kingdoms and with international players will each be examined 
independently.  Afterwards, the type of authoritarian regime in Morocco could be 
measured against that found in Jordan, to see whether there is a genuine shift toward a 
softer version of authoritarianism.  
To be able to determine how this selection process takes place, Heydemann’s 
five features of authoritarian upgrading will be examined in the two monarchies 
before and after the “Arab Spring”. If there is a change in regime mechanism in all the 
features, then the model applies to the two case selections. If there is no regime 
reaction or change, it either means the variable did not impact the survival of the 
 
10 Heydemann, 5.b 
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monarchies or the regime mechanism of handling it before the “Arab Spring” was 
more than enough to keep it out of the threat zone. If some of the features apply and 
others do not, this falsifies the model on the case studies but does not rule out the 
possibility of having partial authoritarian upgrading. 
Moreover, to deal with legitimacy basis, this research has a historical element 
to be studied. The sources of legitimacy of both Jordan and Morocco have to be traced 
back in time, concurrently with a research on the current process of change or limited 
liberalization in the two states. 
Historical analysis thus constitutes a major element in the methodology, as it 
reveals the context behind main concepts in this thesis, namely on the state formation 
of Jordan and Morocco, the origins of tribal-state relations and the institution building 
processes in both states. Furthermore, historical analysis helps the merging of the past 
with the present, by allowing present-day theories on survival of monarchies to be 
explained by events or processes that date back to the beginning of state formation. 
Primary and secondary sources are to be examined and analyzed for 
qualitative research mainly; this includes specialized journals, books and newspaper 
articles. Furthermore, this research will include a section on analysis of several 
reports, Freedom House, and Bertelsmann Stiftung only to name a few. Recent 
reports, which focus on the period post- “Arab Spring”, will be examined to see how 
the two non-oil producing states are doing on the authoritarian upgrading scale.  
 
Literature Review: 
Despite the absence of much literature on the lack of transformation in Arab 
monarchies, there seems to be a consensus among writers, on reasons for the survival 
of such regimes from the wave of revolutions in “Arab Spring”. In his article “The 
 11 
Resilience of Monarchy”, Ludger Kuhnhardt emphasized that “the strongest source of 
authority of contemporary monarchies in the Arab world (and elsewhere) is the 
traditional legitimacy attributed to their rule”11. In Morocco and Jordan specifically, 
the kings are still loved and respected as the rightful rulers of the state because the 
legitimacy of their rule is backed by religious claims.  
Sean L. Yom and F. Gregory Gause confirm that “the Alaouite Crown of 
Morocco and the Hashemite House of Jordan claim descent from [Prophet] 
Muhammad himself”12. This automatically grants them the right to be the heirs of the 
thrones; hence, not facing the same challenges of having to defend their rule, like 
leaders in Arab republics. Nur Koprulu further stresses on the issue of legitimacy to 
rule specifically for the Jordanian monarchy, arguing that King Abdullah I was able to 
consolidate his rule through focusing on the “political power of non-Transjordanian 
dwellers, stressing the tribal elements of the nascent Jordanian identity”13. Both 
religious and tribal legitimacy added to the element of loyalty to the royal family 
before that to the nation state. Further literature focuses on the state formation of non-
oil producing monarchies, the division of politics, the handling of opposition and 
“Arab Spring” protests. 
 James L. Gelvin, touches upon why he believes the Moroccan King has 
retained his position, stating: “the King of Morocco bases his right to rule on his 
descent from a dynasty reaching back as far as the seventeenth century”14. Moreover, 
with the King’s full command over the military and the police force since the 
 
11 Ludger Kuhnhardt, “The Resilience of Arab Monarchy,” Policy Review 57-67. 173(2012): 63. 
12 Sean L. Yom and F. Gregory Gause, “Resilient Royals: How Arab Monarchies Hang On,” Journal of 
Democracy 74-88. 23(2012): 77. 
13 Nur Koprulu, “Consolidated Monarchies in the Post, ‘Arab Spring’ Era: the Case of Jordan,” Israel 
Affairs 1-10 (2014): 7.  
14 James L. Gelvin, The Arab Uprisings: What Everyone Needs to Know (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press,2012), 121. 
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country’s independence, he has been able to lock down his grip on the institutional 
foundations of the state, further preventing power sharing.  
This emphasis on institutional control by Arab monarchies was also supported 
by Yom and Gause, “Kings organizationally stand above everyday politics, they can 
skillfully intervene in the system to spearhead controlled reforms, that diffuse public 
discontent.”15 By controlling state apparatuses, through institutions and important 
governmental positions, monarchs are able to allow or limit opposition to their rule, 
civil liberties and public political participation. Furthermore, and specifically in 
Morocco and Jordan, Kings “often outmaneuver opposition by offering limited 
democratic openings”16.  These democratic openings usually do not reflect a genuine 
move towards democratization; on the contrary, they are announced in an effort to 
cover for government shortcomings. Whether these democratic openings are indeed 
effective or not will be later discussed in depth, as the research crystallizes.  
Another point of analysis is the mechanism of control for Arab monarchs; 
Kuhnhardt argues that “most personal and patrimonial rulers in postcolonial societies 
resorted to similar mechanisms to maintain their position: patronage, clientalism, 
theft, corruption, crime and violence”17. Arab monarchs in Morocco and Jordan used 
some of those tactics to rule; however, their traditional legitimacy and the tribal 
affiliations sugarcoated those actions and gave them the necessary space to politically 
limit their people.  
Adding to the above-mentioned, Yom and Gause comment on the secret to 
successful rulings of Arab monarchs stating: “Arab kings, emirs, and sultans 
command natural authority thanks to Islamic values, tribal mores, and hereditary 
 
15 Yom and Gause, 75. 
16 Ibid, 75. 
17 Kuhnhardt, 63. 
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principles that resonate in their societies”18. The literature available seems to be 
focused on the concept of inherent legitimacy to rule, whether through religious 
claims, historical backing, slight political openness or institutional control.  
To be able to understand what exactly holds monarchies together, one needs to 
have an in-depth analysis of Jordan’s and Morocco’s state-formation and its 
institutions, as well as historical background and progress. In addition, the element of 
adapting to regional social, economic and political shifts has to be analyzed, in order 
to note the impact of the “Arab Spring” on non-oil-producing monarchies. This is 
where the concept of upgraded authoritarianism comes in handy. 
 Change in the nature of the authoritarian rule for Arab monarchies, especially 
in Jordan and Morocco, has been gradual. Steven Heydemann in his analysis on 
upgraded authoritarianism confirms that although Arab regimes generally maintain 
their authoritarian nature, they have also been able to slightly cope with calls for 
democratization even before the Arab popular uprisings. Heydemann states that Arab 
regimes have “expanded political spaces- electoral arenas in particular- where 
controlled forms of political contestation can occur. They have also tempered their 
opposition to Islamist political participation”19. With regard to Jordan and Morocco 
specifically, Heydemann confirms that both states have been able to slightly open up 
to opposition, and in a manner that secured considerable participation in parliaments.  
 According to Martin Beck and Simone Huser, there’s a clear difference 
between non-oil-producing monarchies and other republics or oil-producing 
monarchies in the Middle East. Beck and Huser categorize Jordan and Morocco as 
“stable authoritarian systems”, whereby popular protests in those two countries did 
take place at the time the revolutionary wave swept the Arab world. However, “if the 
 
18 Yom and Gause, 77. 
19 Heydemann,1. 
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political situation in the two monarchies before the “Arab Spring” is compared with 
the situation in 2011, it becomes clear that there has been an unmistakable qualitative 
leap in the political mobilization of society”20. Due to the gradual liberalization 
implemented by the monarchs in Jordan and Morocco, a stabilizing mechanism was 
able to formulate, which helped in their survival from the “Arab Spring”. 
It is important to take note of yet another point made by Beck and Huser, 
which confirms that even within this ‘non-oil-producing monarchies’ category, 
regime reaction towards the popular protests was not homogenous. Beck and Huser 
“questioned whether Morocco is undergoing a genuine process of democratization or 
simply liberalization. In Jordan, however, there are strong indicators that political 
change has so far been limited to purely cosmetic reforms”21. This of course, is not 
enough information to decide whether transformation really did take place in 
Morocco as opposed to Jordan, it is merely stating what literature has to offer on this 
topic.  
This conclusion by the two authors is based on the degree of liberalization and 
the type of reform held by each monarch. Beck and Huser add that in Morocco, there 
was a referendum on a new constitution in 2011 and there were sharper demands for 
an independent judiciary, which were addressed by the King through “absolving the 
minister of justice from his supervisory role over the Superior Council of 
Magistrates”22. Although to a large extent the Moroccan King retained his powers, 
and in some cases, has gained even more leverage to appoint almost half of the 
members of the Superior Council, the changes that he implemented confirmed to 
Beck and Huser that actual, gradual liberalization in Morocco is underway.  
 
20 Martin Beck and Simone Huser, “Political Change in the Middle East: An Attempt to Analyze the 
‘Arab Spring’”, German Institute of Global and Area Studies: Institute of Middle East Studies 1-35 
2012: 20 
21 Ibid, 23. 
22 Ibid, 21. 
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Other literature by Alfred Stepan, Juan linz and Juli Minoves also confirms 
that the Moroccan king had on several occasions, post the 2011 protests, been able to 
outmaneuver the protestors by offering political and social solutions to the kingdom’s 
problems. Stepan, Linz and Minoves confirm that it was a shortcoming from the 
February 20th Movement that they called “for constitutional changes without also 
demanding free and fair elections for a constituent assembly”23. This allowed the king 
to take advantage of the volatile position he is in and put himself on top of politics 
once again, as the initiator of possible liberalization in the country.    
 In Jordan on the other hand, reforms to the electoral law were implemented, 
new parliamentarian elections were in place and an anticorruption campaign was 
launched, all after the “Arab Spring”. However Beck and Huser state: “it must be 
noted that a new electoral law and the promotion of political parties alone would not 
change the fact that the parliament is a weak institution in Jordan’s political 
system”24. Having applied reforms on institutions that do not possess the necessary 
power for decision-making has left open criticism against the Jordanian monarch, in 
wake of the somewhat more evident reforms in its Moroccan counterpart. 
Katerina Dalacoura’s article also adds to Beck and Huser’s research. 
Dalacoura confirms that relative to the rest of the Arab countries that witnessed 
protests in 2011, Jordan and Morocco have seen only minor demonstrations in both 
countries, but responses by the monarchs reflected an image of a liberalized vision, 
which calmed down the public to some extent. When discussing Morocco, Dalacoura 
confirms that amendments to the Moroccan constitution “opened up the political 
system to a degree ad included some important reforms, for instance strengthening 
 
23 Alfred Stepan, Juan Linz and Juli Minoves, “Democratic Parliamentary Monarchies,” Journal of 
Democracy 35-51 25(2014): 15. 
24 Ibid, 22. 
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parliament and making Amazigh (Berber) an official language”25. This move also 
touches upon the societal implications of adding Berber as an official language, 
because it is playing on the fabric of the Moroccan society, in a sense being inclusive 
of its significant Berber community. 
Dalacoura also had some comments on the reforms in Jordan, stating: 
“amendments would strengthen the judiciary and the protection of civil and political 
rights”26. These small, yet gradual, attempts at liberalization seem to be protecting the 
monarchies that lack the financial resources to compensate their people. However, as 
Dalacoura and many others note about the situations in Morocco and Jordan, “the 
kings’ executive powers remain undiminished and they retain the right to appoint the 
prime minister”27.  
Some of the literature examining monarchies in the Arab world even provided 
predictions on their fate, confirming that their survival cannot solely depend on their 
right to rule anymore. Jane Kinninmont foresees that the survival of Arab monarchies 
in general is a short term process, as it ignores the fact that “most of the republics- 
including Egypt, Iraq and Libya, all of which saw their hereditary rulers overthrown 
by coups in the 1950s and 1960s- were monarchies once too”28. A second, more 
important point made by Kinninmont is the assessment of the degree of legitimacy 
that the monarchs have; “perceptions of royal legitimacy are difficult to evaluate in 
political contexts which lack reliable opinion polls or a free press, and which typically 
have laws against ‘insulting the ruler’”. Measuring legitimacy and confirming its 
authenticity is clearly hard in Arab monarchies, especially if there is a degree of 
repression involved. 
 
25 Katerina Dalacoura, “The 2011 Uprisings in the Arab Middle East: Political Change and Geopolitical 
Implications”, International Affairs 63-79. 88 (2012): 72. 
26 Ibid, 73. 
27 Ibid, 73. 
28 Jane Kinninmont, “Arab Monarchies Cannot Survive by Divine Right Alone”, World Today 2012:1. 
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Stepan, Linz and Minoves however had a different outlook with regard to the 
future of monarchies, focusing more on reasons that prevent them from falling. The 
authors specifically focused on idea that Morocco is a country that has great ties with 
its international allies (U.S., France and Spain), a reason they believe is strong enough 
to prevent any attempt to overthrow the monarchy; “should internal conditions ever 
become ripe for a move toward democratic parliamentary monarchy, these three 
powers would support it”29. As for their commentary on Jordan, the authors confirmed 
that the country’s situation is stable in the hands of its monarchy for the moment. This 
is mainly because the king has proposed change that has not yet crystallized into 
proper action reflecting real democratization, while the public response has lost a lot 
of its momentum. The authors propose that that for transformation to take place, “the 
people should keep trying, [and] create more political pressure”30, an element that is 
not so visible on the Jordanian political scene today.  
This literature review has focused on the elements that helped non-oil- 
producing monarchies survive, until this day, the “Arab Spring”. The dual causes of 
legitimacy in all its forms and authoritarian upgrading have been clearly marked, and 









29 Alfred Stepan, Juan Linz and Juli Minoves, 45. 
30 Ibid, 49. 
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CHAPTER II 
FEATURES OF REGIME DOMINATION  
Post-Independence Modern day State-Formation: 
 Jordan and Morocco were breaking off from the colonial powers in their 
strive for independence; and although they were sharing similar experiences and 
having the same rentier character, amongst other traits, the state-formation of non-oil 
producing monarchies differed between the two states. 
On the one hand, Morocco has been under the rule of the Alawi dynasty since 
the seventeenth century and continued to be so throughout Morocco’s colonial 
experience as a protectorate of Spain and France, until its independence in 1956.  This 
long-standing family rule represents centuries of ownership to the throne; even 
throughout the early 1950s, when Sultan Mohamed V was forced into exile, he still 
believed that the sovereignty of Morocco was tied to the rule of his family and their 
duty to serve the people31. This entitlement to rule was further bolstered by the 
presence of a strong nationalist movement that was fighting off the Spanish and 
French occupation forces and rooting for the return of the monarchy as the sole 
independent unit holding the state together. In addition, Sultan Mohamed defied the 
colonial powers and declared his support for independence, 
“this act, along with his increasing confrontation with the Residency, and the 
increasingly outspoken nationalist movement’s choice to elevate Sultan Mohamed as 
a symbol of Moroccan sovereignty, enhanced his prestige as a sign of continuity of 
the Moroccan state”32.  
Not only did the nationalist movement support the return of the monarch from exile, 
but they also iconized his return as one of the achievements of the movement against 
colonial powers. The monarch became embedded in the foundational pillars of the 
 
31 James Sater, Morocco: Challenges to Tradition and Modernity (New York: Routledge, 2010), 23. 
32 Ibid, 5. 
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Moroccan modern state and his presence was existential to the continuity of the 
“authentic combination of traditional, religious and modern sovereignty”33.  
 Mohamed V was able to consolidate his power grip over the independent 
Moroccan state by ensuring the support of a group of loyalists; “at independence, 
more than 70 per cent of the population was living in rural areas controlled by rural 
notables…[they] would become the King’s loyal political force”34. However, this 
rural-urban break also resembled Mohamed’s ability to manage the different social, 
political and ethnic factions in the country in a way that better served the survival of 
his monarchy. This manner of manipulating social gaps, favoring some over others 
while concurrently maintaining relations with all has been a strategy used by 
Mohamed V and passed on to Hassan II. For Hassan II especially, this mechanism 
proved helpful on the political scene, where “he sought constitutionalism and 
elections as a means not to be associated to Sultanic despotism-even if real power was 
increasingly located in informal royal networks and shadow ministries consisting of 
appointed advisers”35. 
 The significance of supporting the monarchy in the newly independent state 
was a crucial matter to the colonial powers, especially France.  Certain interests had to 
be maintained under a different type of relation than colonizer and colonized, one that 
is based on “a form of interdependence that would guarantee its [France’s] economic 
and geo-strategic interests”36. By ensuring that power is saturated exclusively in the 
hands of the monarchy, rather than any other body in Morocco, France was able to 
strike two birds with one stone. On the one hand, its state interests were met through 
their alliance with the King, and on the other, they satisfied the Moroccans’ goal of 
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gaining independence. This support was embodied in different forms, the most 
significant of which was the military and police forces that safeguarded the throne of 
the monarchy from opposition.  
 On the other hand, the Hashemites were associated with the Hijaz until 
colonial powers, namely Britain and France, ushered the way into a partitioned 
Middle East. The supposedly strategic alliance that the late King Abdullah I bin al-
Hussein shared with the British ended up crushing his expansionist vision of a more 
unified Greater Syria region under his leadership, and in 1923 left him as Emir of 
Transjordan under British guidance37. As a means to assert power over his emirate, 
Abdullah I under British supervision introduced land reforms that restructured the 
power division between tribesmen and other individuals in the area. Land was 
redistributed in a manner that empowered those individuals to become the “new class, 
a land-owning elite whose interests lay with the newly land-wealthy King”38; while 
concurrently maintaining loyalty of and control over tribal sheikhs. These land 
reforms also served economic purposes for the state, as they eased the process of tax 
collection and enhanced the agricultural production process39. 
 Pillars of the modern state started to consolidate in various elements, 
especially through providing security and services to the people; “establishing law 
and order and protecting the agricultural communities was the first priority of the 
government”40. Health services, loans for agricultural development, enhanced 
infrastructure and the emphasis on the presence and protection of the country’s 
borders were all signs of transformation from emirate to established modern state. 
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Although this was a difficult process, many alterations yielded positive results for the 
emirate; “the country was stabilized, raids ceased in the settled zone, agricultural 
communities enjoyed a degree of security and the Treasury collected taxes”41.  
In March 1946, around two decades after the establishment of the emirate, 
Transjordan finally gained its independence from the British and was renamed the 
Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. By then, Abdullah I was able to create certain pillars 
that would hold his newly born state; he “developed key institutions, including the 
country’s 1928 Organic Law, which planted the seeds for a fully fledged 
constitution”42. Abdullah also needed to secure the throne from opposition and make 
sure that he had enough military capabilities to do so; therefore, he turned to the 
British “for establishing [a] central authority backed by substantial military force”43. 
Not only was this Abdullah’s plan to block possible opposition, but it was also means 
to balancing the tribal power that previously dominated the political scene.  
Between Abdullah’s assassination in 1951 and the short-lived reign of his son 
Talal bin Abdullah between 1951-2, the newly established kingdom was inherited to 
the late King Hussein bin Talal. Jordan’s state formation years were marked with 
challenges to fight off colonialism, to create modern day state institutions and to leave 
the country in the hands of a ruler capable of absorbing the social, economic and 
political challenges of the state and turn them into viable conditions to work with. For 
many, Hussein was able to do just that; he was considered “the father of the modern 
state…Hussein’s genuine biculturalism, which allowed him to feel at ease in the West 
as much as in the East, helped forge a climate of openness and tolerance”44.  
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This section discussed in detail the state formation processes of Morocco and 
Jordan post-independence, with certain reflections on previous rulers and the manner 
in which they held the power grip in both countries. The role of Mohamed VI and 
Abdullah II is not mentioned in this part of the thesis, because further chapters 
carefully examine the dealings of these two monarchs with opposition, civil society, 
economic and political dilemmas, as well as foreign ties with international and 
regional players. 
Despite being both non-oil producing monarchies of similar features, Morocco 
and Jordan proved to have different colonial experiences and state formation types. 
Morocco has a long history of Alawi rule since the seventeenth century and its 
colonial experience was one that pushed the monarchy to be call for a stronger 
nationalist movement. Jordan however, is a constructed state, carved out of 
agreements that partitioned the Middle East. It is a state that rests on tribal alliances 
with the monarchy and the continued interference of political and economic foreign 
presence. Yet, it is still important to note that the similarity lies in the manipulation of 
certain social groupings that would later become the monarch’s loyalists. This of 
course is one of many similarities that will be outlined in the next section on religious 
and tribal legitimacy.   
In this section, there was little emphasis on the role of the tribes, their 
integration into the modern state and the form of reinforcement they provide for the 
state, despite their significance in the state formation. The reason tribes are going to 
be discussed in the next section is to integrate the essence of tribal structures with the 




Legitimacy: Religious and Tribal 
 As mentioned in the conceptual framework, this thesis rests on the argument 
that legitimacy of different types has been a determining factor in the survival of non-
oil producing monarchies in the Arab region. This section studies in-depth the 
religious and tribal elements that the monarchs of Morocco and Jordan used as means 
to fuse legitimacy with their rule. 
 Both in Morocco and Jordan the monarchs claim lineage to the Prophet 
Mohammad (PBUH). In Morocco, the King holds the title “Commander of the 
Faithful”; he is the one to whom the people have pledged allegiance and promised to 
protect through a special relationship that puts him above all matters that tend to 
separate them45. The title Commander of the Faithful does not just add the element of 
legitimacy to rule over the throne, but it also attaches a sacred-like feature to the 
King; “attacking him would be both a crime and a sacrilege-inseparable notions in 
this logic-at once a violation of divine law and desacralization of a figure of Islamic 
piety”46.  
This example is not exclusive to Morocco only. In Jordan as well, the King is 
regarded as a red line and offending him would be considered a crime, as descendants 
of the Prophet (PBUH) also include the Hashemites family, who root back to the 
Prophet’s daughter Fatimah47. Moreover, the idea that the monarchy is directly linked 
to the Prophet (PBUH) gives the Jordanian and Moroccan people the reassurance that 
what is sent from above will prevail over earthly matters48. This way of thought 
stresses the importance of the monarchy as an institution -with a strong religious 
backing-, as a crucial element for the survival of the state, not only from external 
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threats but also from internal political and societal matters that could be points of 
dispute between people. 
Before diving in to the tribe-state relations and the integration of tribes into the 
modern state system, focus should be placed on the motion of baya’a (oath of 
allegiance) that groups in both countries have pledged to the monarchs. The concept 
of baya’a epitomizes the type of legitimacy that the people give to the King; baya’a 
“makes him effectively stand above constitutional constraints…it confers divine 
powers on the King ‘the holder of the legitimate authority is God’s shadow on earth 
and his secular arm in the world’”49. The baya’a ultimately means submission of the 
people to the king and the hierarchy that he tops as the main decision maker.  
 Due to the importance of gaining people’s loyalty in both countries, many 
state-group relations had to be modified, especially tribal ones. Tribe-state relations 
had to be carefully monitored and maintained during the state formation years of 
Jordan and Morocco. Tribal structures had to be examined and reshaped with the 
formation of the modern state, to ensure the loyalty of the tribesmen to the monarchy 
and to also appeal to such groups so they can later be appointed in key positions under 
the supervision of the King.  
Sealing tribal alliances paved the way for the monarchs to use the social order 
within these groups to control the process of integrating them into the state system. 
During state-formation years, the concepts of kinship, descent and the dominance of a 
certain hierarchy in tribal organization were manipulated by the state to promote 
territorial and other authority-related matters50.  
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Morocco’s tribal structure differs from Jordan’s; although both share similar 
characteristics of tribal groups, the purpose, transformation and role of tribes varied 
between the two countries. 
Tribes in Morocco are not a single unit and are consistent of different 
populations, Arabs and Amazigh; therefore, their analysis should incorporate each of 
the groups and their assimilation into the new modern state. There were two power 
hubs in Morocco; bled el-makhzen and bled es-siba; “the former was under the 
effective control of the sharifien government and paid taxes to the makhzen, while 
bled es-siba recognized the spiritual legitimacy of the monarch, but was dissident in 
its refusal to pay taxes to the makhzen coffers”51. Before further expansion on the 
Makhzen and its meaning, it should be noted that although bled es-siba refused to pay 
taxes, they still maintained their legitimacy to the throne and its right to rule. Makhzen 
literally means ‘treasurer’; it symbolizes the institutional power of the monarchy, and 
is also considered a regulator of conflict issues, under the guardianship of the King. 
Learning the meaning and significance of the Makhzen is very critical in 
understanding the role of tribal leaders in Morocco, as they are considered to be 
groups under the banner of the Makhzen, the main institution regulating the state.  
In the process of state formation, some tribal leaders or caids governed local 
administrations, and “allied themselves with Makhzen in order to protect their 
territorial and economic interests”52. Yet others, specifically bled es-siba (mainly 
affiliated with the Amazigh population) found their interests served with the French 
colonial rulers. The French wanted a strategic plan that would weaken the Moroccan 
state; but simultaneously needed to find a possible ally within the population. This 
match obviously had consequences on the state composition, as the French 
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protectorate “curtailed most of the administrative powers of the sultan and replaced its 
traditional administration with modern bureaucratic and technocratic structures”53. At 
this point, bled es-siba also came under the control of the monarchy and was 
integrated to balance against the other tribal groups in the country. 
 It is important to note that the position of some tribes was controversial at the 
time of state formation, especially with their relation to the monarch. Many caids 
reinforced and pushed forward the petition that called for Mohamed V’s exile; so, it 
was quiet difficult for him to reinstate them in trustworthy positions once he was 
back54. The monarch kept all groups under his administrative control; however, only 
the rural notables were the ones to form the loyalist group for King Mohamed V at the 
time of independence55. 
The idea that the Moroccan monarch ultimately handles matters of the 
Makhzen allows him to reside over everyday politics, country spending and the 
overall decision-making process. As for the tribal leaders, those who managed to 
avoid signing the exile petition were allowed to run businesses and protect their 
interests vis-à-vis the monarchy. Others who allied with the French still fell under the 
territorial expansion scheme and administrative leadership of the king. The caids or 
the local tribal leaders were not treated all as a single unit, as the case in Jordan; the 
Moroccan King managed them in groups according to their earlier political stances. 
In Jordan, the case is somewhat different; the structure of the modern state was 
a mirror reflection of that of the tribes. Therefore, by operating in the same 
organizational system, it was easier for the government to provide services “ranging 
from tax distribution, collection or exemption to the control of the spread of diseases 
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or organizing the elections to the Legislative Council56. Abdullah I was also smart to 
incorporate the tribal element in the state, without altering the structure of the tribes 
themselves; “employing chiefs as mediators between the government and the 
tribesmen and minimal interference in the social structure of the tribes proved 
effective strategies”57. Abdullah was also able to keep check of the tribal leaders, who 
in turn ensured the maintenance of stability within their groups. The King further 
provided the tribal Sheikhs with services and material rewards, important recognition 
in public, the chance to join him on tours around the kingdom, the ability to evade 
tax-paying, and the privilege of overriding government decisions58.  
Jordan’s transformation into a modern state rested on this inclusion of the 
tribal element. The tribes were too strong and dominant to be excluded from politics, 
yet weak enough to be coopted by the King. Yet, the presence of groups that follow 
certain hierarchies internally later reflected as a problem of security to the state. In the 
case of Jordanian tribes, the government found it extremely difficult to exert power in 
tribal strongholds and “it demanded that the Shaykhs guarantee security in their area 
of influence themselves, to prevent crimes of all kinds”59. Although the security-
related fate of some areas remained under tribal supervision, the Sheikhs guaranteed 
loyalty for the king, because he on the other hand is the sole person who feeds their 
chieftaincy system and keeps it vital. In a system of mutual beneficiary, the king and 
the tribes found ways to mutually co-exist and share power. 
Legitimacy, whether religious or tribal, seemed to benefit the monarchs of 
both Jordan and Morocco. In the case of Morocco, religious legitimacy seemed to be 
the more dominant type, especially that even the dissident tribes were earlier outside 
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the administrative control of the state, but still responded to the religious authority and 
dominance of the monarch. This not only legitimizes his rule, but also allows him to 
make the necessary changes, whether political or social, with unlimited space. This 
space to maneuver was apparent the most when Mohamed V expanded his control 
over bled es-siba, without altering the status of the Makhzen: “the modernization of 
the administrative apparatus, [and] the construction of a bureaucratic structure…may 
have signaled a rupture with the old Makhzen. However, the heart of the authority of 
the Makhzen remained unchanged60.  
In the case of Jordan, religious legitimacy holds a great weight in the 
legitimacy of the King, yet tribal legitimacy and the insurance that tribes would 
support the monarch also played a vital role in the survival of the monarchical 
institution. It seems like the tribal element in Jordanian politics had a saying in the 
security and stability of the state, especially in areas where tribal arrangements 
dominate the state. Furthermore, it is obvious that the pillars of the Jordanian state rest 
upon the ties of the monarchy and the tribal order above all; “the regime promotes 
loyalties based on the desire to defend both the honor of the tribes and the institution 
of the monarchy rather than to defend the notion of the nation state”61. 
 This point does not undermine the religious backings of the Jordanian 
monarch against the Moroccan one. It merely notes that the religious dominance of 
the latter was linear, continuous and most notable amongst other types of legitimacy, 
and it remained consistent despite colonial rule and internal gap threats. While the 
religious element of the former had to be coupled with other supportive types of 
legitimacy, to construct formal institutions of the state and help maintain it.  
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State Institutions and National Campaigns Pre-“Arab Spring” 
 Fear of losing the power grip in the state is less evident in monarchies than 
republics, due to a certain reassurance from the people that the monarchies have the 
right to rule. However, this does not exclude the idea that monarchies also have 
certain state institutions and mechanisms to carefully ensure their optimal control over 
the state. Control can be manifested in two manners; either physically on the ground, 
through military and police apparatus or controlled elections for example, or 
emotionally through creating national campaigns and slogans that bolster the national 
sentiments of the populations at hand. This section examines and analyzes the state 
institutions and national campaigns used by Morocco and Jordan, to see what 
mechanisms they use for state survival. 
 Morocco and Jordan are both constitutional monarchies that have the façade of 
a democratic system in place, but in truth the king has the final call on all decisions 
taking place in the country. Note that this section emphasizes on the pre-“Arab 
Spring” mechanisms and national campaigns, so that it can later be compared to the 
post-“Arab Spring” reforms and state changes. This comparison will highlight the 
elements of transformation and how the two monarchies coped with the challenges 
they faced since 2011.  
 Morocco and Jordan have a bicameral system of parliament, consisting of two 
chambers; in Morocco, there exists the House of Representatives and House of 
Councilors, while in Jordan, there is the House of Representatives and the House of 
Senate. In both cases, the bicameral system is double -faced mirror, reflecting 
democratic practices on the outside, while truly protecting the monarchy and its 
interests on the inside. Bicameralism in such cases does not truly reflect the 
representation of the people; on the contrary, it works for and is operated by the 
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monarch in place; “in theory, bicameralism is supported to bolster the image of a 
legislative institution that is representative of the preferences of various interests…in 
practice, bicameralism was designed to reinforce the pre-existing social and political 
divisions”62. Not only that, but parliament is utilized in a way that maximizes the 
presence of loyalists, while still maintaining stability in “representation of tribal, 
ethnic and religious forces”63. So long as parliament members are kept under close 
watch, to ensure that they would maintain the status quo rather than create 
disturbances, their presence will only remain as a façade of democracy that is in no 
way representative of the people’s actual demands and needs.  
 Another stronghold for both monarchs is the ability to control government and 
remain on top of everyday politics. The king selects ministers in the cabinet as civil 
servant figures, who achieve their purpose of fulfilling his orders64. The dilemma here 
is the deadlock that keeps emerging after lack of change frustrates the people; blame 
is placed on the government, especially the residing prime minister, who in the first 
place is just following orders and in reality “has no legal or constitutional authority 
over his cabinet”65. This gives the monarchs the advantage of reshuffling the cabinet 
as a temporary fix to popular pressures. 
 National identity and emphasis on national unity through state sponsored 
campaigns is one of the most coordinated ways to informally influence the people and 
create a single project they can all relate to. In both Jordan and Morocco, the issue of 
national identity is quite controversial, due to the presence of a diverse population 
(especially with Berbers in Morocco and Palestinians in Jordan). The existence of 
such distinct groups pushes the state to construct a national identity specifically to 
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defy issues that cause divisions in society. This issue also has collateral effects, 
especially for the monarchy, demonstrating it as the protector of its diverse 
population. How the national campaigns differ between Morocco and Jordan is 
defined below. 
 This issue can be highlighted in the Moroccan scene through the national 
campaign that aims at including the Berber community for example, which 
increasingly, has been adding pressure to be recognized by the monarchy. By 
assimilating the Berber community and integrating it into the fabric of the Moroccan 
society,  
“the king recognizes the multicultural nature of Morocco and defines Moroccan 
national identity as more than exclusively Arab, but a blend of many cultures and 
languages…the monarchy’s recognition of Berber is seen as a political tool to garner 
support from all Moroccans and international organizations, and to quiet most Berber 
activists”66. 
 
This campaign however presents a problem to the monarchy; on the one hand it is 
trying to paint this image of a tolerant and diverse society to widen its support base. 
On the other hand, there is popular rejection by Arabs to the idea of recognizing 
Berbers, the “largest and from time to time the most restive ethnic minority in 
Morocco,”67 as part of the Moroccan community, which can also act as a challenge. 
This dilemma even presents itself culturally, where some people refuse that their 
children even learn the Berber language, defining it as inferior68.  
 Earlier national building campaigns in Jordan were complicated due to the 
presence of strong tribes that hold power in the country. Instead of focusing on the 
concepts of nationalism and patriotism, emphasis was placed on the interactions of the 
king with the tribes; “the loyalty of a tribesman grows from a desire to defend the 
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honor of family, tribe, and king, and not to some abstract notion of Jordanian 
patriotism”69. Yet, with the influx of more Palestinians into the kingdom, a societal 
rift widened between the Jordanians and Palestinian Jordanians, leaving the monarchy 
in quite a challenging position to find a balance to accommodate the needs of both 
people.  
 In an effort to diffuse the existing societal gap, a new national campaign was 
launched under the title al-Urdun awwalan, literally translating to Jordan First. The 
purpose of the campaign was to emphasize the rights and liberties of all Jordanians 
(regardless their country of origin), in an effort to overcome obstacles to 
modernization; to the monarchy, “it was a matter of assuring some degree of cohesion 
and establishing the ‘political legitimacy’ necessary for the gradual change to a 
modern nation-state”70. However, this process of building a national identity also 
backfired, bringing out more oppositional voices against the regime and concurrently 
highlighting the economic mishap in the country. In the process of trying to diffuse 
the gap, more Jordanians lost their ability to connect through the tribal elements and 
its concepts of honor and loyalty, while Palestinian Jordanians found it as an 
opportunity to voice their discontent at the state71. 
 The difference between Morocco and Jordan is that the process of integrating 
the Berbers into the Moroccan society was a matter of gradually absorbing a group 
that has always been part of the Moroccan identity, despite ongoing difficulty and 
negative popular attitudes. However in Jordan, integrating two people with separate 
national identities, while simultaneously attempting to recreate a unified identity 
seemed like a much harder task for the monarchy. By claiming the Moroccan identity 
above all, the monarchy was able to maintain the legitimacy of its own national 
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identity, with it being more inclusive of other groups. However, in Jordan, by 
reconstructing a new identity that overrode values of tribal elements and disregarding 
the origins of many Palestinian Jordanians, the monarchy lost some of its political 
legitimacy as promoter of Jordanian nationalism. 
 In this chapter, similarities and differences were highlighted between the two 
countries; yet, one of the most defining characters that distinguish them apart is the 
nature of handling political opposition. Although indirect mechanisms of control are 
discussed under the title of state institutions in this chapter, the details of 
understanding political opposition is examined thoroughly in the following chapter. 
Juggling political opposition in constitutional monarchies is very difficult, especially 
when the purpose of the system defies its representative aspect. Studying the nature of 
political opposition and the manner in which their handling differed between non-oil 
producing states can inform us more on its organization and strength, as means to 














OPPOSITION HANDELING PRE-2011 REVOLUTIONARY WAVE  
 Chapter three studies in-depth the monarchies’ mechanisms of control over 
political opposition, specifically in the period pre-“Arab Spring”; as Morocco and 
Jordan handled opposition differently, yet both succeeded in crippling opposition 
groups in the kingdoms. Examining the conditions of opposition groups pre-2011 
revolutionary wave allows for a comparison to be made about the monarchies’ ability 
to absorb the wave without giving enough space for opposition to crystallize into an 
apparent threat to the monarchical institution. 
 
Divide, Rotate and Rule: Morocco vs. Jordan 
 The manner in which political opposition is handled in Morocco and Jordan 
determines the type of constitutional monarchy the states adopt. The multi-party 
system in Morocco allows the monarch to control opposition through a divide and 
rule strategy, giving parties the opportunity to participate in politics and ensuring that 
they weaken each other through competition. While in Jordan, the opposition is dealt 
with as a single bloc, with challengers fighting against and criticizing the actions of 
the regime, regardless of their ideological differences72. A distinguishing feature 
between Morocco and Jordan is that political parties were allowed to operate formally 
in Morocco since its independence, with the decision consolidated through its 1962 
constitution, while their counterparts in Jordan became formally legal to operate only 
from 1992 onwards. 
 The Moroccan political scene is complicated; its multi-party system was born 
out of the monarch’s desire to increase competition between the political parties, so 
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his position as ruler and final arbitrator is not threatened73. The democratic façade of 
existence of political parties only bolstered the position of the king internally and 
abroad. Internationally, it reflected a more tolerant political space and for Moroccans, 
it increased legitimacy of the monarch, despite that its purpose in fact is to weaken the 
most dominant opposition in the country74. It is important to also note that with the 
implementation of the first constitution, it was hard to exclude certain political parties 
from the political scene completely, seeing as they played an essential role in the 
process of state formation. The Istiqlal party was a major element in the nationalist 
movement against the French occupying forces and their role could have only been 
limited, but not completely eradicated when the decision about the fate of political 
parties was made in Morocco. 
 Tensions kept escalating between the monarchy and the opposition throughout 
the early 1970s, with the King slightly losing grip over rule, and surviving an 
attempted coup d’état and several assassination plots75. Repression and arrests of 
opposition members continued throughout this period, to reassert Hassan II’s control 
over the political scene and firmly show the opposition that he would not receive 
threat easily. This rocky period reflected major consequences on political parties in 
Morocco after the 1970s, where several parties were banned from legally operating, 
especially those that proved to be in contestation with the king’s position.  
 Since King Hassan’s situation was to allow certain political parties to 
formulate and function under his rule, his strategy was to divide opposition and 
regulate them; “King Hassan II allowed the growth of the Islamist opposition in the 
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early 1980s as a counterweight to his secularist opposition”76. By allowing the 
formation of more parties, the Moroccan King ensured that all groups had their share 
in politics, so as to remain far from the monarchy and its rule.  
In 1998, King Hassan was also able to create a new system for dealing with 
political opposition in a more inclusive manner, through introducing the government 
of Alternance. By alternating in government between political blocs, “opposition 
would be brought in to head a coalition of the main political parties and independent 
royalists”77; this manner guaranteed a win-win situation for the king. The success of 
such approach will reflect political legitimacy on the monarch’s behalf and its failure 
will expose the weakness of opposition. This approach to political parties differed 
quite distinctly from King Hussein’s approach to political parties operating in Jordan, 
where no political parties were allowed to operate until the Political Parties Law of 
1992 was enacted.  
 The Jordanian context differed for a couple of reasons. First, the monarchy 
prohibited the legalization of political parties in Jordan, after a failed military coup in 
195778. This of course eliminated the chance for any political participation in the 
system and as the Moroccan monarch did, Hussein also asserted his full control over 
the political arena with his loyalists. The difference between the two monarchs was 
that Hussein excluded political opposition completely, seeing as they acted more of a 
unified single threat, mobilizing against his position rather than competing groups 
trying to eliminate one another. 
 Second, this strategy of exclusion of opposition forces was not a constant plan 
that King Hussein followed throughout his rule, unlike the one used by his Moroccan 
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counterpart to control opposition. From the late-1950s till the period of intended 
liberalization in the late-1980s, Hussein kept his close watch over opposition, making 
sure that they ran in parliamentary elections as independent candidates, since political 
parties were banned. However, the activities of the opposition groups were not 
entirely hindered by this formal ban of political parties; on the contrary, opposition 
still tried to perform its role by “rally[ing] social forces, using the professional 
associations, informal organizations, and underground parties and publications as 
catalysts for unrest”79. It was important for opposition to keep a foot in the political 
sphere, even if their roles were informal; they were groups that fostered constant 
pressure to the monarchy and ensured instability to the status quo. 
 After the economic crisis that shook the kingdom in 1989, King Hussein 
implemented liberalization policies that reopened the way for parliamentarian 
elections again, legally allowing and regulating political parties, giving more press 
freedoms, and relatively taking a more democratic turn, although the ultimate 
decision-making still pertained to the king80. This process of liberalization reflected 
political legitimacy on behalf of the monarchy, portraying a trend of easing up on 
political opposition internally, while simultaneously proving to the West that a more 
tolerant political process was underway. In reality, the economic crisis caused the 
king to remove subsidies and apply a strict plan to abide by the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) loan81; therefore appealing to opposition and giving them more 
space to maneuver was a strategy to alleviate the economic pressure that the people 
were facing. 
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 Opposition groups welcomed this change to a multi-party system, as they were 
at the time calling for political reform rather than the king’s abdication to the throne. 
Political parties across different ideological spectrums were part of this process and 
any monarchical fears of opposition groups overstepping the king’s authority were 
minimal; King Hussein “was changing the rules of the game without changing the real 
distribution of power”82.  
 Participation of political parties under authoritarian rules is difficult, and as 
noted above, it all comes down to the wishes of the monarch and how much political 
space he is willing to provide opposition with. Despite liberalization attempts in both 
Morocco and Jordan, it was clear that handling opposition before the 2011 
revolutionary wave was a matter of maintaining legitimacy as a cover to other 
economic downturns rather than an actual step forward towards democratization.  
The next section will discuss the actions of the dominant political parties pre-
“Arab Spring” and their interactions with the monarchy. Questions like how they 
perceived regime actions, why did they participate or abstain from participating 




To be able to understand the role of political opposition before “Arab Spring”, 
the dynamics, history and strategy of the Islamists in both Morocco and Jordan have 
to be analyzed. The case of the Islamists in Jordan and Morocco will be carefully 
dissected in the next section to see the development of their political parties and the 
magnitude of their opposition. Moreover, an in-depth analysis of their roles 
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culminating up to the “Arab Spring” will be conducted. Since Islamists include 
different political groups, only the most dominant political parties that participate in 
formal politics will by examined; the two study cases include the Justice and 
Development Party (PJD) in Morocco and the Islamic Action Front in Jordan.  
 
Morocco’s Justice and Development Party: 
 The Justice and Development Party in Morocco witnessed several 
developments since its creation in 1997. Its Islamist ideology had to be reshaped to fit 
into the complex political system of Moroccan politics. This section gives a historical 
background of the party, its leadership and transformation over time, to see how it 
politically maneuvered into becoming the most dominant group representing 
Moroccans and holding position in government in the year of the “Arab Spring”. 
 The establishment of the PJD in 1997 came with certain rules and regulations; 
the political party detached itself from the proselytizing faction, the Movement of 
Unity and Reform (MUR) and separated itself from the religious activities the group 
undertook83. This separation for the PJD came in the form of creating a distinct 
character and form for the party, which was confined within the laws of the Moroccan 
constitution. It was established for the sole purposes of participating in formal 
politics, and presented an agenda that dealt with “questions of democratization of 
governance, institutional and constitutional reforms, and integration of the masses 
within the national development plans”84. 
 It was clear that the PJD was careful in constructing its political program, to 
appeal to as many voters as possible. The PJD’s outlook on the elections was skeptic, 
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especially with the idea of joining forces in a national government; the party feared 
the concept of getting tangled in the hype of politics, so instead it “focused on popular 
tactics such as the fight against corruption”85. This soon turned into a strategy of 
survival for the Moroccan PJD, addressing issues that do not just pertain to Islamist 
voters.  
 Survival strategies for an Islamist party under the rule of an authoritarian 
regime, especially a multi-party system that fostered the division between political 
parties required strong leadership. Abd al-Ilah Benkiran, a pragmatist in reality, was 
“a dove politically, but a cultural hawk”86; his interactions with the monarchy amidst 
other centrist parties elevated his discourse into one that promoted a more moderate 
stand with the king. Benkiran’s hawkish counterparts in the party have a sharper tone 
toward the monarch; they believe that a drastic constitutional reform is needed to 
reassess the powers of the king and set Morocco on a true democratic path87.  
Benkiran balances himself well between the hawks of the party and the 
monarchy; he stresses the importance of preserving an Islamist identity but with 
moderation, he emphasizes constitutional reform but understands that the monarch is 
above politics and his powers cannot be contested. Benkiran’s most successful 
strategy was “opposing the workings and performance of the government instead of 
challenging the legitimacy of the monarchical institution”88. Despite the late arrival of 
the PJD to the Moroccan multi-party system, its leadership under Benkiran allowed it 
to climb the ladder of power quickly; his moderate positions, his understanding of the 
limitations of working under an authoritarian regime and his ability to learn from the 
trial and errors of previous political parties in Morocco took him a long way.  
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The outlook of the PJD toward parliamentary elections reflected a belief that 
any change that is to happen has to take place within the system, manipulating the 
rules of the game, gaining as many votes as possible and entering formal politics. 
They also tried to improve the image of representative institutions, so that voter 
perception and regime attitude toward the party would be presented in a more positive 
light89. This attitude pushes the PJD to participate rather than boycott elections in 
Morocco, and for the party, this outlook meant greater voter turnout and higher 
popularity.  
By defying the obstacles of the political game, and focusing on their political 
program, the PJD participated in all parliamentary elections after its establishment, 
but did not take part in the government of Alternance.90 This allowed it to have an 
advantage over other political groups by the first year of the “Arab Spring”. Here, the 
Islamist advantage was reflected in the party’s ability to carefully examine strategies 
of competitive parties, to escape from being scapegoats to the errors of government 
and portrayed themselves as the powerful alternative by the time the November 2011 
parliamentary elections came to light.   
 
Jordan’s Islamic Action Front: 
As mentioned earlier, political parties in the Jordanian Kingdom were banned 
from operating until 1992, when King Hussein decided to introduce a new law 
allowing their political participation. The political parties that formed did not just 
spring overnight; many of them worked underground for a long period of time; 
however, “democratic themes had not been prominent in their political agendas or 
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publications prior to the political openings”91.  One of those existing groups was the 
Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan. 
Due to the cooperative relations that the royal family shared with the Muslim 
Brotherhood in Jordan since its establishment in 1945, it was the only group that was 
allowed to operate in the realm of social organizations. This of course facilitated the 
MB’s entrance into the Jordanian political scene. Consequently, as soon as the 
political openness legalized political parties, the Islamic Action Front (the political 
wing of Jordan’s MB) was created.  
Like its Moroccan counterpart, the IAF reflects a rift between the party 
leadership, also divided among soft and hard-liners. Of course, the IAF party has one 
platform, where it “calls for the implementation of Shari’a, denounces corruption, 
advocates a Jihad (struggle) to liberate Palestine, stresses support for the Jordanian 
Armed Forces and…calls for public freedoms and democratic expansion”92. However, 
the hawks and the doves disagree on positions regarding three main important issues 
that are critically linked to the decision-making of the party and they are: the 
Palestinian issue, the role of Islam in governance and the approach toward the 
political system in the kingdom.93.  
 The doves, under the leadership of Hamzeh Mansour, are pragmatic and very 
supportive of the royal family; they act moderately by emphasizing the importance of 
following a democratic path while simultaneously reassuring the monarch that they 
are not after his abdication to the throne94. On the other hand, the hawks take on a 
more rigid stance toward the royal family, as they do not believe the principles of 
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Islam are being applied properly as they should while the Hashemite family is in 
power. 
With regard to participation in electoral politics, at the brisk of the first 
multiparty elections in the Kingdom, a new electoral law favoring tribes over party 
list was enacted, limiting the participation of the Islamist blocs. Despite this setback 
by the regime, the IAF still managed to win seventeen seats in the November 1993 
elections95. Fear of the Islamists winning majority in parliament led the regime in 
Jordan to place tight control on electoral laws and seat distribution number in areas 
with Islamist stronghold. Furthermore, the liberalization process that started in the 
early 1990s gradually retreated before the 1997 elections; modifications to the press 
and publication law “dramatically increased restrictions on newspapers, raising capital 
requirements twenty-fold and expanding the list of untouchable ‘security’ issues”96. 
Limitations on civil rights and political participation, as well as increased corruption 
and favoritism for loyalists supporting the royal family were clearly noted in the 
decade prior to the “Arab Spring”.  
A particular emphasis was placed on the IAF because it is the strongest and 
most prominent opposition in the Kingdom, one that has been stirring demonstrations 
and protests in Jordan. For the monarch, it was the most opposition group that needed 
to be kept under close control, considering its standpoint on the boycott of elections; 
this abstention from participation was used as a party strategy to delegitimize the 
position of the state97. Furthermore, they were the ones who pushed for certain powers 
to be stripped from the king, namely prohibiting him from dissolving parliament and 
choosing the prime minister from the parliament. However, it is important to note the 
absolute powers of the monarch, as he appoints representatives in the Upper House, 
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controls parliament and elections, oversees every single individual and institution 
without having any body overseeing his decisions or actions98. 
The IAF’s participation in parliamentary election took a different turn than its 
Moroccan counterpart. Of the 6 elections held after the party’s establishment in 1992, 
the IAF only participated in three and boycotted the rest, specifically in the 2010 and 
2013 elections, prior and post “Arab Spring” respectively. Besides the concept that 
boycotting elections discredits the regime, a major reason behind IAF’s abstention 
from participation is that the actual people they are representing belong to the group 
of Jordanians who are originally Palestinians (constituting majority of the population) 
but are underrepresented in the first place99. This results in an unequal distribution of 
parliamentarians representing the different groups constituting the Jordanian 
population, especially with the increased number of seats belonging to pro-regime 
loyalists or tribal heads representing the minority in the country. 
The problem that this dilemma also poses is the manner in which political 
transformation will take place in Jordan from now onward. The pressure that the IAF 
is facing with regards to its decision to exclude itself from formal politics is pushing it 
to have a more direct and harsh tone calling for political reform in the country. The 
next chapter will dive into the developments of the opposition with the monarchy 
post- 2011 popular upheavals and will analyze whether real political reform resulting 
in democratic change is possible to occur. 
As this section outlines, the position of the most dominant and influential 
Islamist political parties in both Morocco and Jordan were dissected. To understand 
the mechanism of control of the PJD and the IAF, one needs to put them into context. 
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The PJD was established in 1997, as a latecomer to the Moroccan political scene, 
especially with other political parties legally operating in the country decades before 
that. The PJD also had a moderate outlook toward the political game, whereby they do 
not allow for the political system to control them, but instead try to enhance the 
representative institutions to become more credible for the public. Furthermore, its 
choice to participate in politics, despite many disadvantages working against it and 
that the monarchical institution will remain the utmost exerciser of power, has 
benefitted its position in the past years, building up to its victory in the first elections 
after the “Arab Spring”.  
In the Jordanian context, it can be noted that the Muslim Brotherhood had an 
advantage over other political parties, as it was the only group that was allowed to 
operate under the banner of a charity organization since the country’s independence. 
Its members established a political party in 1992 as soon as it became legal, but the 
party got caught up in the unfair political game, whereby it was trying to change the 
rules of participation, rather than focusing on a specific program that appealed to the 
majority of voters (who are very underrepresented). Furthermore, the wide rifts 
between the party’s doves and hawks on basic principles and goals for the party make 
it extremely difficult to defy an authoritarian regime and gain confidence of the 
voters. The IAF’s position on the participation or boycott of elections is also 
confusing; it boycotts elections in an effort to highlight its uncompetitive and unfair 
elements, and to delegitimize the position of the monarch. However, it does not call 
for the king’s step-down from the throne, but rather participate in informal venues and 
street politics as a drive for change.  
This chapter has covered the regime interaction with opposition groups, with 
specific focus on the most dominant political parties in the country, especially in the 
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period prior and leading up to the “Arab Spring”. The next chapter will contain the 
most valuable insight to the core of this thesis, emphasizing the conceptual 
framework, and its relation to the text as well as outlining the elements within 
authoritarian regimes that have progressed, regressed or remain constant after the 
revolutionary wave of 2011. Questions regarding the concept of upgrading 
authoritarianism will be examined and analysis of whether Morocco and Jordan fall 





















UPGRADING AUTHORITARIAISM IN MOROCCO AND JORDAN 
Chapter four examines and analyzes the most recent developments that occurred in 
Morocco and Jordan since the beginning of the “Arab Spring”. In this section, the 
adaptation of the monarchies with the revolutionary wave, the effectiveness of 
political reforms and the maneuvers of forces on the ground in both countries are to 
be studied. Moreover, several Freedom House and Bertelsmann Stiftung reports 
tackling the five-point features discussed by Heydemann earlier on role of civil 
societies, political opposition, economic reforms, communication technologies and 
international ties will be assessed in an effort to understand the process of 
authoritarian upgrading in Morocco and Jordan. The reports analyzed cover the post- 
“Arab Spring” period and give information on the transformation that took place, if 
any. The assessment of those reports will then be used to examine whether the two 
countries are genuinely moving towards a more democratic path, regressing towards a 
more authoritarian status or changing survival techniques to preserve the status quo. 
 A brief overview of the popular uprisings and challenges that Morocco and 
Jordan faced since 2011 will be mentioned; however, details will only focus on the 
transformations that took place with respect to Heydemann’s five-points on 
authoritarian upgrading. Despite Heydemann’s authoritarian upgrading scale 
beginning with the role of civil society, this thesis will begin with the examination of 
handling political opposition post-“Arab Spring”. This will highlight the pre and post 





Managing Political Contestation: 
 The first feature in the upgrading authoritarianism scale is the ability to 
manage political contestation. For authoritarianism to be maintained and upgraded, 
regimes have to handle political competition in a more democratic structure, even if it 
just through cosmetic reforms. These types of electoral reforms reflect to the outside 
world a transformative path toward a more liberal and free competition, while 
concurrently managing a tighter grip on opposition groups100. 
Managing political contestation post- revolutionary wave in Morocco was 
tricky; the main group that was leading the protests that broke out on February 20th 
and which derived its name from the date mentioned above was “a band of youth, 
leftist, and Islamist activists”101. The February 20th movement demanded political and 
economic reforms from the monarch and called for an end to corruption in the 
country; after constant pressure, King Muhammad VI responded to the protest by 
offering to redraft the constitution.  
The July 2011 constitution, fully supported by the PJD and boycotted by the 
February 20th movement, did not curb the monarch’s power, yet promised a more 
independent judiciary and gave more space for parliament to participate in the 
decision-making process, “allowing it to pass laws and bills and grant amnesty”102. 
The new constitution also compels the monarch to assign the winning party leader as 
head of government103; however, all the amendments mentioned above do not reflect 
a true power shift from the monarchy to the state institutions as much as it is the 
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strengthening of the parliament and judiciary, with the king still having the last call on 
decision-making.  
 Despite all those difficulties still in the path of the democratic process, the 
PJD decided to reap the seeds that the February 20th movement sowed and participate 
formally in the transformation, instead of taking it to the streets. The PJD participated 
in and won the November 2011 parliamentary elections, under the leadership of 
Abdelilah Benkirane.  
The Moroccan case highlights a very important note; the largest and most 
organized opposition party (PJD) was pulled into the political process and is now 
trying to complete the democratic path through formal institutions. It was emphasized 
in the last chapter that PJD has learned from the mistakes of other parties throughout 
the years, but the fact that it is now part of the system restricts its fierceness in facing 
the strength of the monarchical institution. Not only does the party have to politically 
maneuver now that it is heading the government, but it also has to ensure that its 
promises and proposed policies come to life for the people. 
 One challenge for the PJD is the organizational options of this Islamist party, 
which are under tighter control than its Jordanian counterpart. Whereas in Jordan the 
MB exists as a separate entity than its IAF political wing, both functioning 
autonomously through parallel structures, the cornering of the IAF within politics 
allows the MB to have a tougher stance with the government on the streets. For the 
Moroccan PJD, the case is different; there is no alternative body that can challenge 
the monarchy outside of politics.  
Another dilemma that the PJD has been facing since its arrival to power is 
translating their words into action; “the party platform does not specify mechanisms 
for funding either new initiative jobs for unemployed youth or small- and medium-
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sized enterprises”104.  Funding problems do not reflect in creating new job initiatives 
only, but also in managing the public fund allocation to solve other issues of poverty 
and unemployment as well. Unless the PJD finds a way to revise their platform in a 
more realistic manner that deals with the economic constraints, it will be confronting 
a harsher reaction by the people and most probably a lower voter base than the 2011 
elections. 
The monarch dealt with each group in the country differently and according to 
their interests. For the Amazight population, cultural demands, “especially regarding 
language, have largely been met in the last decade”105 and Tamazight is 
acknowledged as an official language in the 2011 constitution. The leftist and leading 
Islamist parties were sucked into the political game and co-opted by the regime106 and 
the last standing group is the opposition working outside the system, namely the 
February 20th movement. Several Human Rights Watch reports have confirmed the 
use of violence and torture against the protestors from the February 20th movement, 
and the counterterrorism law is still enacted, “permitting authorities to detain suspects 
without informing their families for up to 12 days”107. Depending on the severity of 
the demands and the manner in which they were asked for, by various political and 
cultural groups in Morocco, the monarchical institution found varying ways to 
maneuver its way through the political contestation and limit its scope. 
Though similar protests broke out in Jordan, the defining difference between it 
and Morocco is that the leading opposition group and the biggest Islamist party in the 
country (IAF), is the one working outside the system and managing the protests in the 
kingdom. Following the route of the “Arab Spring” states, opposition groups took it to 
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the streets in January 2011 and demanded economic and political reforms to alleviate 
the status of the Jordanians. King Abdullah II met those demands through the 
implementation of  
“41 constitutional amendments, the establishment of a constitutional court, the 
institution of elections under the auspices of the newly installed Independent Election 
Commission (IEC), the revision of the long-criticized electoral law in June 2012 and 
the dismissal of four prime ministers”108. 
Furthermore, the king amended the selection process of the prime minister, instead of 
single handedly appointing him, the new prime minster would be chosen after 
deliberation with parliament. What the monarchy saw as positive change towards 
more inclusive policies to accommodate opposition was seen by the opposition as 
superficial and minor transformation that did not alter the reality on the ground. 
Unlike their Moroccan counterparts, the IAF boycotted the only parliamentary 
elections following the revolutionary wave, seeking instead the pressuring of the 
regime outside the formal political game. 
 The IAF’s problem does not just reside in the fact that it does not formally 
participate in politics; it also has a very vague political program and does not offer 
clear solutions to any of the economic problems that the country is facing. Despite the 
IAF’s constant criticism to the government’s approach toward subsidy and 
privatization policies, they still fail to even formulate a workable vision to offer it in 
their program as a substitution109. How can an opposition party aim at participating in 
politics, if their agenda is not clear to the simple citizen? And how then do they 
propose to be effective in government (in case of their election) if there are no 
guidelines or proposed solutions to begin with? One should not disregard that even in 
government, there are still limitations to its role; but that does not deny that the 
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performance of the IAF in Jordan fails to meet that of the other Islamist parties in the 
region.  
 The “Arab Spring” that later paved the way for many Islamist governments to 
come to power in Tunisia and Egypt also raised fears for the Jordanian monarch. 
Controlling the Islamist opposition in Jordan was important for the survival of the 
regime; therefore, the state ensured that parties “founded on ‘religious, ethnic or 
sectarian’ basis”110 were banned. With the maintenance of strict electoral laws, and 
other regulations checking the oppositions’ power, as well as the ability to preserve a 
strong pro-regime cadre through favoritism, clientalism and other regime tactics, the 
Jordanian monarchy has been able to dismiss opposition temporarily.  
 Like the Moroccan February 20th movement, some protestors in Jordan 
experienced police brutality and were arrested in the midst of tear gas bombings; 
however, the severity of the situation in the country did not escalate to the extent that 
it did in other surrounding “Arab Spring” states. Even in cases where protestors were 
arrested, King Abdullah II issued pardons releasing them after a while111.  
 Political maneuvering has proved successful so far in both the Moroccan and 
Jordanian cases. Political contestation has been limited, with interest groups kept 
satisfied and co-opted by the regimes, while other more critical opposition groups 
silenced through force. The distinction between Morocco and Jordan is the role of the 
Islamists in the ongoing dilemma, whereas the PJD in the former chose the formal 
political path, the IAF in the latter chose informal opposition through street politics. 
Although in both cases the constitutional reforms did not alter significant changes for 
the opposition, the Moroccan situation rings more frequent alarm bells, due to the 
vacuum left behind by the Islamist opposition.  
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Containing Civil Society:  
 The second feature, similar to the strategy utilized in the first, is the 
containment of civil society groups. By allowing the function of civil society groups, 
associations, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), etc. under state supervision 
and limitation, then their pressure on the regime would lessen, while their beneficial 
services would extend to the people in a more pro-regime oriented attitude112. 
The degree of existence of civil society associations differs between Morocco 
and Jordan, despite both sharing similar restrictions by the two monarchies. In 
Morocco, civil society groups, including NGOs have to fall in line with the regime’s 
agenda, or else they do not receive funding to operate; this is why it has been 
conducted that “the impact [of civil society groups] was strongest in the fields of 
education, social development and assistance to the poor”113. Other groups that do not 
share the same opinions as the state and try to either criticize or pinpoint wrong 
doings by the regime face three possible outcomes, either do not receive legal permits 
to run, are overlooked or sued, depending on their degree of fierceness against the 
regime. Technically, associations within civil society can run freely; for example, they 
are just required to get a certain license; but practically the government does not pass 
it out easily. This way, the association operates illegally and can be cracked down by 
the government as it pleases114.  
The significant role that the Moroccan state plays in the interaction with civil 
society can be seen through its various attempts to handle issues that are sensitive to 
the population at large, yet ones that can still be controlled regularly and given space 
to function according to the monarchy’s will. One of the controversial topics that have 
been placed under the spotlight especially since the early 2000s is the issue of human 
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rights in Morocco and the function of international organizations protecting human 
rights in the country.  
Whereas international human rights organizations were banned from hosting 
and participating in conferences on the matter of human rights in Morocco before, 
several organizations such as “Amnesty International and the International Federation 
of Human Rights were invited to Casablanca in January 2001”115, in efforts to revisit 
the role played by the monarchy with regards to this matter. This change in attitude 
reflected good will to the people that the monarchy is trying to advocate for better 
protection of human rights. Simultaneously, it tried to prove that human right abuses 
are individual cases that are not embedded in the system as a whole, and that poor 
attitudes and behavior of the police toward human rights mirror lack of education116.  
NGOs are also utilized by the Moroccan regime as a security valve “to 
marginalize political parties”117. By allowing the NGOs to operate on social and 
economic gaps of the regime through state funding, the monarchy maintains an upper 
hand on the agenda of the organization, while concurrently taking credit for their 
work. Furthermore, this increases public opinion in favor of the state, to defy possible 
alternatives offered in the political programs of oppositional parties. Instead of 
applying pressure on the government, civil society groups in Morocco are obliged to 
function under the state umbrella, operating for the will of the people, but according 
to the conditions specified by the state. Despite the above-mentioned, the presence 
and growth of civil society organizations in Morocco since the 1970s cannot be 
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denied; according to the latest statistic conducted in January 2013, the number of 
existing NGOs in the country amounts to 30,000118.  
 Civil society organizations in Jordan face similar challenges as their Moroccan 
counterparts, yet they still differ in composition and numbers. Development of civil 
society organizations in the kingdom began with the liberalization wave of 1990s, 
with the number of NGOs reaching 2,000 in early 2013119. Many of these groups face 
dilemmas if they were to function against the regime, because their purpose in non-oil 
producing Arab monarchies is almost self-defeating. The growth of civil society 
groups in Jordan was explained by the Bertelsmann Stiftung report as more of a 
positive addition to the state’s legitimacy and a new form of indirect co-optation of 
these groups120.  
The royal family controls the biggest projects aiming at development and 
helping the poor; usually these groups do not require containment and are left to 
politically wonder more freely than other groups. Due to the tribal nature of the 
Jordanian society, many civil society groups are established and work under the rubric 
of “tribal kinship and personal relations”121. The presence of groups based on tribal 
relations is a double-edged sword; it is one way to emphasize issues of solidarity to 
maintain the social fabric of society, especially at a sensitive time of popular uprising, 
but it is also a reminder of the societal gap that exists between the Transjordanians 
and the Palestinians in the country. The containment of such groups is more 
geographical and class-related than ideological, as their work is “confined to the 
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upper-middle class, and is restricted to Western Amman, the affluent part of the 
country’s capital”122. 
The Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan offers a lot of charity work, both as part of 
their religious duties and also as means to enlarge their support base. As a group 
offering social services, the MB’s charity organization is allowed to function, 
especially in the fields of education, health and the general well being of the citizens. 
This point remains complex however, because even with the MB’s charity 
organization, the Islamic Center Charity Society, the government still interferes and 
regulates its function. Since 2006, the administrative control of the Charity fell under 
direct government control and post- “Arab Spring” pressure, in 2012; there have been 
talks of redirecting it to the MB123. However, no confirmation has been made about 
this matter officially. 
Local Jordanian reports on the role of civil society in the transformational 
period post- “Arab Spring” confirmed that there are “challenges revolved around 
structural obstacles, as well as legislative and governmental124” ones. Government 
lock down on civil society organizations in Jordan remains present and in a way that 
hampers the services they can offer for the reform process. Despite several 
constitutional amendments that have been announced post 2011, the government 
dealings with the civil society organizations in the kingdom did not witness a change 
in their scope of action. On the contrary, reports show that “the mobilization of civil 
society in both institutional organizations and demand-driven movements was less 
than necessary in terms of quantity and quality of their presence”125.     
 
122 Ibid, 16. 
123 Freedom House, Countries at the Crossroad- Jordan. New york: Freedom House, 2012: 6. 
124 Musa Shtiwi, Center for Strategic Studies University of Jordan and Spanish Agency for 
International Development (2012), The Role of Civil Society Organizations in the Political Reform in 
Jordan, Amman, 3. Available from http://www.foundationforfuture.org.  
125 Ibid, 40. 
 57 
Containment of civil society organizations exists to a large extent in Morocco 
and Jordan; however, both regimes deal with each group differently and according to 
the purpose and severity of its existence. In many cases, groups that provide charity 
work, especially those concerned with education, health and development are either 
coordinated through state funding or are parts of projects initiated by the royal family 
in the first place. Civil society groups that aim at advancing a political purpose faces 
much harsher rules and regulations, beginning with legal recognition to operate and 
ending with very little, if any space to politically maneuver. Morocco and Jordan 
share quite a large gap with regard to the number of civil society groups they contain 
and their existence and growth as a whole; however, with the similarities apparent in 
the regimes’ dealings with both, it is safe to say that the survival of civil society 
groups in both depends mainly on the willingness of the regime to allow them to.  
 
Capturing the Benefits of Selective Economic Reforms: 
 The 2011 popular uprisings in Arab states pressured many governments to 
revise their economic policies and expenditures. Having no oil revenues to 
compensate the people like many Gulf monarchies did, Morocco and Jordan were left 
with economic reforms to calm the streets. The third feature for upgrading 
authoritarianism is the government’s ability to reap the seeds of selective economic 
reforms; those actually foster the patronage system and allow for pro-regime business 
groups and military complexes to expand, without capturing the essence of 
transparent, equal opportunity economic reforms for the majority of the population126. 
 Morocco’s economic situation has been under the microscope since the 
beginning of the popular protests. Attempts at liberalizing market competition have 
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been hindered by the high degree of state interference, nepotism and corruption, due 
to the domination of the regime, alongside pro-regime families over the majority of 
holding companies in the country127. In 2013, the government implemented reforms 
“to improve the protection of minority interests, construction permitting and tax 
filing”128; yet regime involvement continues to pose challenges to investors interested 
in the country.  
 Further international trade agreements have been signed between Morocco and 
the EU and tariff reduction policies have been implemented; nevertheless, the 
authorities still have an upper hand on the trade process, and their “administrative 
inefficiency and widespread corruption”129 continue to hamper this trade process. 
Heavy regime interference in the economic reform process has reflected the same 
challenges that were faced in the implementation of the country’s political reforms. 
Although at the face level Morocco is doing its efforts to liberalize and open its 
markets to foreign trade and investment, the inability of the government to remove 
itself from the equation has deemed international trade agreements hard to implement.  
 In early 2012, Morocco also launched its capital market code as part of its 
effort to reform the banking sector; yet, the body that regulates and oversees this code, 
constitutes of politicians and advisors who can also tamper with government 
policies130. This makes it all the more difficult to move forward, almost hitting a 
deadlock until economic interests of the concerned members are met through political 
meddling.    
 Another significant issue that is hindering economic reform in the country is 
the increase of government subsidies post-“ Arab Spring”, as a means to calm angry 
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protestors. Budget deficits have shifted significantly from a surplus in the 2000s, to an 
$8 billion deficit in 2011, as food and energy subsidies expanded “from MAD 29.8 
million (about $3.5 million) in 2010 to MAD 52.3 million (about $6.1 million) in 
2012”131. Measures to cut down on the deficit have already been taken by the 
Moroccan government in late 2012, with a $6.2 billion loan deal with the IMF, on the 
condition that subsidies are gradually decreased. 
 Considering that almost 40% of the Moroccan workforce has jobs in the 
informal sector, they are deprived of the already weak social security and health care 
programs in the kingdom. Although there was an increase in funding to these 
programs amounting to 2% in the past couple of years, it is still considered much 
lower than the public spending on these services worldwide (which averages to about 
3.3%)132. 
 Certain measures have been implemented in the past year to secure Morocco’s 
already weak economic situation; yet with this level of corruption and state 
interference, no positive outcome has been noted so far. Moreover, with an increase in 
subsidies and a still tax return, budget deficits are to be treated with IMF loans; 
however, it is clear that economic reforms in Morocco have been concluded as a 
temporary fix to the protests that took place in the country. What will the consequence 
be once the government pressures the people back into the economic reform path, 
which will come at the expense of their well-being? 
 Jordan’s economic situation is similar to that of Morocco’s, with pro-regime 
businessmen having strong domination over leading companies in the market, the 
informal sector holding up to 44% of the workforce and international trade 
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agreements signed with the U.S. and EU since the early 2000s133.  Certain economic 
liberalization plans regarding the oil sector have been underway since 2010. However, 
the reforms mandated that fuel subsidies be removed in November 2012 and popular 
rage about the matter took place right after, demanding the step down of government. 
Authorities then reassured the people that cash payments to 70% of the population is 
to be distributed to cover the gap left over by the subsidies. 
 The banking sector is looking promising compared to Jordan’s serious 
economic situation, where positive net income growth has been on the rise since the 
beginning of the 2011 revolutionary wave. The Central Bank of Jordan has also been 
taking measures to avoid inflation, while other modifications on a smaller scale 
including “public sector wage increases, the distribution of cash assistance 
payments…and compensation payments for families particularly affected by the 
removal of fuel subsidies”134 have been easing the economic strain as well. 
 Economic pressures and ill provision of services also prevail, like the case in 
Morocco, especially that almost half the population works in the informal sector. But 
Jordan also faces other challenges, especially with many Palestinian- Jordanians 
deprived of the social services in the country.  
Economic reforms in the country and attempts to alleviate the rising economic 
pressure might have slightly increased the economic growth from 2.3% in 2010 to 
2.7% in 2012135; however, unemployment, poverty, as well as fiscal deficit problems 
continue to pose a huge threat to the Jordanian economy. The government might have 
escaped the raging population by offering some cash payment compensations, but the 
sustainability of such measures are up for question. 
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Economic situations in Morocco and Jordan might have been handled 
differently, with one gradually removing subsidies, while the other paying cash 
compensations instead, but the end result looks similarly unpromising. Strains on the 
economy have had its toll on the people, more than the worsening political situation 
has been. The governments of both might have evaded the rocky post-“Arab Spring” 
economic condition, but more permanent measures have to be introduced to be able to 
ensure survival of the monarchical institution. 
 
Controlling New Communication Technologies: 
 The use of modern communication technologies in the Arab popular uprisings 
has been largely noted and examined. Opposition groups mobilizing for protests 
utilize online social media tools, through its various venues, be it Facebook, Twitter, 
YouTube or any other communication platform. The fourth upgrading 
authoritarianism feature tackles specifically the regime’s control of new 
communication technologies. It is important for regimes to acknowledge that new 
technologies are on the rise and can be utilized as tools of mobilization; but it is 
equally significant for them to create the atmosphere that allows for these 
technologies to persist while also controlling its content through state regulations136. 
This section is dedicated to understanding how Morocco and Jordan dealt with the 
challenge of new technologies and the degree to which these technologies were vital 
in the popular uprisings that took place in the kingdoms. 
  Like other opposition groups in “Arab Spring” countries; the February 20th 
movement in Morocco utilized Facebook to spread the word and mobilize in their 
popular uprisings demanding social, economic and political change in the country. 
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The Freedom House report on the “Freedom on the Net 2013” confirms that 
government reaction to information on online sites and social media platforms has 
changed before and after the “Arab Spring”. Prior to the “Arab Spring”, information 
containing criticism of Islam, promotion of minority causes or other sensitive matters 
to the regime were removed from the internet. Post “Arab Spring” the government [as 
part of its plan to avoid what happened to its neighboring counterparts] allowed the 
continued existence of such information, with all social media venues available at the 
people’s disposal137.  
This change, however, did not reflect a genuine transformation toward 
democracy where one enjoys the freedom of expression in Morocco; government 
regulation and oversight of online material was still conducted according to 
previously established Press and Anti-Terrorism laws in 2002 and 2003 respectively. 
The application of the Press and Anti-Terrorism laws on online content translates into 
direct government control over the information spread online; anyone that discloses 
information deemed by the government as threatening “national security and public 
order”138 will face charges and possible prison sentence. Some of the February 20th 
movement members were detained for their attempts to mobilize people through 
social media sites; while other singers, bloggers and the like who criticized the 
monarchy or its symbols also faced similar fates139. 
Many Moroccans feel the urge to practice self-regulation or censorship, to 
avoid being monitored or tracked down by the government. Although journalists in 
Morocco do not contain their criticism for the regime as much as others do, the legal 
ramifications that befalls them eventually impact their freedom of expression; “in a 
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state that punishes investigative reporting and whistleblowing, people with sensitive 
information tend to stay quiet to avoid possible retribution”140.  
The status of internet freedom given by Freedom House to Morocco in 2013 
was set as partly free. Though no social media venues or other online platforms are 
blocked, random arrests of bloggers, journalists and others who make controversial 
statements online seem to be still taking place under previously published clauses. 
The Freedom House report on Freedom of the net 2013 also concludes that the 
status of freedom in Jordan is not free141. Unlike Morocco, Jordan’s government has 
tightened its control over freedom of the internet since the “Arab Spring” protests 
broke out. Despite several attempts by the opposition to object to and stop the 
decision, amendments to the Press and Publication Law of 1998 were enacted in late 
2012, which “impose a variety of burdensome requirements to operate online new 
portals, limiting freedom of expression and placing heavy liabilities on 
intermediaries”142. News outlets are kept under careful scrutiny and their work, 
especially anything against the government or the regime, is not tolerated and often 
there is pressure for it to be removed off the net. News outlets that ignored 
government pressures to delete online material were dealt with indirectly. Ammon 
News, an important local news outlet faced this pressure when it published statements 
by tribal leaders calling for reforms; the agency’s system was tampered with and 
therefore had to indirectly shut down for a while143.    
Online social media platforms [Facebook, Twitter and the such] exist and are 
open to all users in Jordan; however, local users know the consequences of writing or 
blogging about sensitive topics that tackle the monarchy, state unity and security, so 
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they tend to self-censor their posts. The general attitude adopted by most Jordanians is 
one of silence, so striking to the extent that the Freedom on the Net Jordan report 
claims: “prosecutions and extralegal attacks on web users have decreased in severity 
over the past year”144.  
Nonetheless, it is still important to note that harassment of journalists and 
closure of news websites continue to take place according to the will of the 
government, even if it is at a lesser extent than previous years.  News sites including 
Watan, Khaberni, and Al Ain had their sites hacked and offices even attacked by 
anonymous committers145. 
This section highlights the containment of the Moroccan and Jordanian 
governments to new information technologies and the means through which they 
control sensitive information from spreading online. Despite several changes that look 
democratic in nature, like uplifting censorship over certain topics that were previously 
taboo, or opening social media platforms to all users despite their strong use in social 
uprisings, all reports examining the freedom of the internet in the two countries still 
confirm their strict nature. The round of anonymous attacks against news sites, the 
silencing of journalists and bloggers and the continuous government censorship over 
new technologies makes it harder to break the general attitude of political silence 
online.   
 
Diversifying International Ties: 
 The fifth and last feature is the ability to diversify international ties, to be able 
to survive longer. Arab regimes use diplomatic ties and sign international treaties to 
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evade being pointed at as countries refusing political and economic reforms146. There 
is constant pressure on Arab monarchies by the international community, specifically 
the West and its institutions, to maintain certain ideals of democracy; it is the job of 
both Morocco and Jordan to preserve and invest in stronger and broader international 
ties, to escape facing the criticism of those actors. This section is concerned with the 
development of international linkages between non-oil producing monarchies and 
other international actors, with regard to the latest attempts toward democratization in 
the post-“Arab Spring” period. 
 Morocco has always maintained strong relations with the West, especially the 
European Union, which has been monitoring the ‘democratic’ transition that the 
country has been passing through since 2011. This thesis has proved earlier that 
Morocco’s ‘democratic’ path has been to a large extent cosmetic more than it is a 
genuine move toward democracy. Despite this fact, the G-8 still commended 
Morocco’s efforts for responding to the 2011 protests with a newly drafted 
constitution. Not only did this EU approval and support come in words, but it also did 
in economic funding through the National Indicative Program, which increased from 
€654 million between 2007-2010 to about €580 million between 2011-2013 (notice 
that the former is four years funding and the latter is three years alone)147.  
 Furthermore, the constitutional redrafting and the attempt to solve the internal 
uprising calmly compared to other “Arab Spring” states kept Morocco as a “preferred 
partner for Western governments in North Africa”148. This locked down safe 
economic and political partnerships between Morocco and Western countries and 
gave the ‘democratic’ transition in the country a more legitimate basis.  
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 As for relations with other Arab states, specifically the Gulf monarchies, 
relations have developed over the last couple of years. Post- “Arab Spring”, Gulf 
countries increased their development and investment in Morocco, as well as offered 
it an invitation to join the Gulf Cooperation Council in 2011 alongside Jordan [A 
section on the GCC and Jordan will also be included below]. The significance of this 
move is twofold, and applies to the Jordanian case as well. First, the Arab popular 
uprisings shook the republics and planted fear in the hearts of monarchies, so the Gulf 
countries saw it as mutually beneficial if other Arab monarchies joined their ranks. 
Second, the obvious Sunni-Shiite divide in the Gulf and suspicions of a Shiite spread 
further fed this move toward a more unified front for the majority Sunni monarchies. 
The invitation was later put on hold, when GCC countries realized that the “Arab 
Spring” wave was handled well by the other non-oil producing monarchies; there are, 
however, recent reports claiming that the GCC is seeking another “pan-monarchical 
military alliance”149. No confirmed alliances have been made so far, and the military 
bloc is still under informal negotiations. 
 In the case of Jordan, its experiences with the international institutions of the 
West have proved its commitment to economic reforms, especially through its 
adoption of IMF and World Bank macroeconomic programs. This of course, comes as 
a direct result of years of Jordan’s close relations with the United States, which has 
been backing the monarchy with economic and military aid. Moreover, despite the 
slow (if any) political change in the kingdom, Jordan like its Moroccan counterpart 
was able to secure its relations with the EU and was granted “advanced status” for its 
efforts in the ‘democratic’ process. Not only that, but EU reports published in 2012 
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also praise the Jordanian monarchy’s efforts and commitment to the process of 
political and economic reform150. 
 Jordan’s situation differs from Morocco with regards to regional linkages, 
mainly because of its geographical proximity to many Arab countries that are facing 
internal conflicts and are spilling over through the borders. With the situation in Syria 
still at a deadlock four years into the “Arab Spring” and Abdullah II’s call for the 
Syrian president to step down, relations with Syria have tangled up again. Bilateral 
relations with Iraq have not been positive either, especially with the minimal contact 
that is taking place with the Iraqi government nowadays. As for the Palestinian 
portfolio, close ties with the U.S. and negotiations with Israel on a Jordanian 
government level still do not reflect the popular attitude of the people towards the 
issue; however, the Jordanian state has maintained its policies of close coordination 
with Fatah officials151. 
 As mentioned in the previous section on Morocco’s regional relations, Jordan 
and Morocco share similar positions as Morocco regarding the Gulf. However, 
Jordanian- Qatari relations seem to be at rocky grounds for several reasons. Jordan’s 
position with regard to Qatar’s “proactive role and support of Islamists and Jihadists 
actors in the violent conflicts in Libya and Syria” is one of condemnation and 
rejection. The Jordanian monarchy also has growing fear that with Qatar’s fueling of 
Islamist groups in Syria, a continuation of the conflict would mean prolonged threat 
on the Syrian- Jordanian borders.  
 The ideological struggle with the GCC entry eventually boils down to a clash 
between Saudi and American visions of how the non-oil producing monarchies will 
survive. On the one hand, Saudi plan for Jordan’s entry into the GCC will increase 
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economic gains for the kingdom at the expense of further reduction of people’s 
political power; on the other hand, the State’s plot encompasses a more direct walk 
through the democratic path, where popular demands are met and actual liberalization 
is fostered152.  
 Morocco and Jordan seem to be following similar tracks with their approach to 
international politics, both keeping tight relations with their closer allies [EU and U.S. 
respectively]. This link with the West is mainly significant because their oversight 
over the ‘democratic’ transition that the Arab monarchies are passing through, allows 
Morocco and Jordan to continue their cosmetic reforms at the expense of the people 
with a legitimate badge. As for relations with the Gulf, the most important move to 
look out for is the possibility that Morocco and Jordan would join other Gulf 
monarchies as part of their survival strategies against popular uprisings. Not only 
would the majority Sunni identity be maintained, but also manpower of Jordanian and 
Moroccan armies would be coupled with Gulf’s advanced weaponry to ensure the 
mutual survival of monarchies in the region. 
 
Synthesis:  
 This chapter has been mainly focusing on the application of Heydemann’s 
five-point features on upgraded authoritarianism to Morocco and Jordan.  With regard 
to the management of political contestation, Morocco has opened way for the 
strongest opposition to join forces in government, putting its policies and actions 
under spotlight and allowing for the public to see their shortcomings. In Jordan, quite 
the opposite took place, with electoral laws implemented in the past still hampering 
the participation of the IAF and excluding it from formal politics. In such cases, the 
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mechanism of controlling political competition differed, but the consequences were 
similar; the regime has locked down its grip on opposition, proving the limitations of 
its visions and highlighting the lack of alternative plans they could offer for the 
country. 
 As for civil society groups, its containments did not differ much between 
Morocco and Jordan, neither did the method of limitation before and after the “Arab 
Spring”. The status of this feature remained static, especially that civil society groups 
are dependent on government support and face dire challenges surviving illegally 
under strong authoritarian regimes. 
 Reaping the benefits of certain economic reforms worked temporarily for both 
Morocco and Jordan. But the fact that nepotism, corruption, state interference and ill 
distribution of sources still exist and are becoming more apparent than before makes it 
all the more difficult to contain popular uproar that might erupt as a consequence of 
harsh economic reforms. The matter to look into is either the sustainability of such 
measures on the short-run or the availability of alternative economic reforms that are 
more permanent.  
 Controlling new technologies does not present means of state control different 
than the ones used prior to the “Arab Spring”; on the contrary, Morocco and Jordan 
seem to demonstrate that the government activity with regards to monitoring online 
users and arresting journalists and bloggers for examples continue to exist. 
Furthermore, the issues that were taboo to be talked about or criticized remained off 
limits, especially concerning the monarchies, state security and the like. Freedom of 
expression and press remain to be tied down, either through self-censorship or 
through press laws.  
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 The last feature on diversifying international linkages is the most apparent of 
all other five points, but still no concrete action has been taken to highlight it. 
Moroccan ties with the EU and Jordanian ties with the US were close before and 
continued to be strong after the “Arab Spring”; however, the fact that there have been 
talks of the non-oil producing states joining the GCC makes all the difference, 
especially that it draws attention to the fears of the monarchs in the Arab world. 
Seeing as the GCC plan has come to a hold, specifically after Morocco and Jordan 
temporarily dealt with their popular uprisings, it is still important to wait and see the 
end result of this proposal. 
 Heydemann’s authoritarian upgrading includes a before/after gap, certain 
transformations that take place showing that things are changing on the surface when 
in reality they are not, certain mechanisms change in order to hinder real 
democratization from prevailing. Although the nature of authoritarian rule in Morocco 
and Jordan did not change before and after the “Arab Spring”, certain mechanisms of 
control had to be adjusted to ease off the popular unrest. The challenges that were 
addressed post revolutionary wave were management of political competition, 
benefiting from economic reforms and diversifying international linkages, as 
illustrated above. While the regime’s dealing with containment of civil society 
organizations and control of new technologies remained stagnant after the “Arab 
Spring”. 
 The following chapter tries to draw conclusions as to where the above-
mentioned synthesis places Morocco and Jordan on the authoritarian upgrading scale, 
and further examines the possible threats that the monarchies overlooked and any 




RESILIENCE OF NON-OIL PRODUCING MONARCHIES 
Chapter five is the concluding one in this thesis; not only does it draw conclusions as 
to the transformations of the non-oil producing monarchies and whether they really 
are upgrading their authoritarian nature, but it also examines the type of regimes 
produced and the future challenges they might be facing. This chapter also includes a 
section on future recommendations, to see the possibility of moving forward through 
gradual political and economic reforms, with a preservation of the monarchical 
system. 
 
Authoritarian Upgrading Model and Non-Oil Producing Monarchies: 
 Chapter IV examined the manner in which regimes in Morocco and Jordan 
handled the situation post popular unrest. It was obvious that regime management of 
certain political and economic challenges had to be addressed, with the help of foreign 
aid of course, be it in collaboration with other monarchical regimes of similar nature 
or through backing from the West. Seeing as Heydemann’s five-point features rest on 
the satisfaction of all points, then this thesis argues against the original hypothesis that 
states: Survival of non-oil-producing monarchies is a function of their own traditional 
legitimacy and the softening of their authoritarian regimes. After the assessment of 
the situation and according to the research conducted above, the results show that 
survival of monarchies does not fit the upgraded authoritarianism model. Instead, the 
survival of non-oil producing monarchies is a function of their own traditional 
legitimacy and the temporary cosmetic top-down political and economic reforms of 
the regime.   
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 It is tricky to assess whether Morocco and Jordan really applied Heydemann’s 
five points to survive the popular uprisings, because there are transformations that 
took place, as survival of the regimes did not come from inaction; however, they did 
not include all the points in the guidelines. The management of political contestation, 
ability to reap the benefits of some economic reforms, and the diversification of 
international linkages are three main features where there is change, although 
sometimes cosmetic, and is very apparent before and after the “Arab Spring”. As for 
the containment of civil society and the control of new communication technologies, 
perhaps the development of mechanism of state control over these issues came at a 
time before 2011. The last two features show stagnancy after the period of the “Arab 
Spring”, meaning the states’ dealings with them were not as visible as the first three 
features. 
 In managing political contestation, cosmetic political reform was underway 
immediately after the breakout of the popular unrest. Fear that the destiny of poor 
monarchies would be similar to other strong republics that fell caused monarchs to 
seek alternative means to appease their people. In Morocco, the King immediately 
called for the drafting of a new constitution, made recommendations to have a more 
independent judiciary, changed the role of parliament so it becomes more involved in 
the decision-making process and also attempted to culturally win over the Amazight 
population by making Tamazight an official language recognized in the new 
constitution. It is true that all of these changes did not reduce the ultimate powers of 
the monarch or produce a new system of checks and balances between the legislative, 
executive and judiciary, but still it was a political maneuver that calmed the majority 
of the population for the time being and concurrently allowed the PJD to enter formal 
politics and get coopted by the regime.  
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These superficial political changes were not only witnessed in Morocco, 
Jordan’s monarch also used similar techniques to steam off the anger that people felt 
toward the then political status quo. King Abdullah II called for amendments to the 
constitution, new free and fair elections, a constitutional court to oversee the 
constitutionality of laws and regulations, the replacement of several prime ministers 
and the expansion of parliament roles, to also include having discussions with the 
king on the appointment and elimination of prime ministers to and from power. All 
these changes highlight state control over the decision-making process; yet, to the 
outside world, this shows a move toward a more democratic political system. 
Upgraded authoritarianism in this case applies to the management of political 
contestation post- “Arab Spring”, because laws regulating and at many times 
preventing opposition from having completely free and fair elections are still present, 
parliaments remain paralyzed to make any decisions because the final saying is for the 
monarch and there is no true development on the road to political democracy as much 
as these transformations emphasize them to be. 
The second point is the ability to take advantage of several economic reforms, 
which both Morocco and Jordan addressed, especially that economic demands were 
one of the main reasons that got people protesting in the first place. Morocco’s 
reintroduction of subsidies and Jordan’s facilitation of cash payments and increase in 
public wages were the alternative offers that alleviated some of the pressure off the 
regime. Although the split before and after the uprisings was clear in the case of 
economic reform, this still is not considered a move forward for the economies of 
non-oil producing states. The nature of the economic changes is so temporary, 
particularly due to the low budget running it. Seeing how both countries have secured 
IMF loans demonstrates that another set of the international institution’s conditions 
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will befall the people sooner than later. For the time being, the fact remains that 
Morocco and Jordan were able to quieten down the streets by offering these 
temporary fixes, which also confirms the second feature in Heydemann’s five-point 
features. 
The third, and I believe the most interesting of all three is the ability of 
authoritarian upgraded states to diversify their ties, treaties and diplomatic relations 
with the international community and its institutions, as well as other regional powers. 
The relations between Morocco and the EU or Jordan and the U.S. has been on the 
positive generally, but more specifically after the cosmetic reforms of the popular 
unrest, mainly because the West applauded the ‘democratization’ efforts of the Arab 
monarchs. What is more interesting to note is the regional collaboration, efforts and 
funds that have been sealed post-2011. Both Morocco and Jordan had been invited to 
join the ranks of the GCC before that deal was placed on hold. Furthermore, there are 
recent unconfirmed talks about having a joint military collaboration between poor and 
rich Arab monarchies. This of course is quite significant because it shows the paths 
that non-oil producing monarchs choose to abide by in future transformations. If they 
select the Gulf option, then funding from the GCC would take Morocco and Jordan 
down the path of political silencing of the people, at the expense of economic 
dependence on the GCC. If they choose the road of economic and political reform, 
then they would be making concessions but one that would serve their interest, as well 
as the interests of their people in a much more efficient manner. This shift of focus to 
emphasize regionalism in post-2011 also fulfills the requirements of Heydemann’s 
point on diversifying international linkages for survival. 
As for the containment of civil society and the control of new communication 
technologies, the situation is particularly different. The fact that no visible change 
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occurred in these two fields post popular unrest consequently presents two 
explanations: either it rules out the possibility that they impact the survival of the 
regimes in the first place or the mechanisms they used before 2011 were strong 
enough to maintain status quo post 2011.  
Laws that allow for the existence of civil society groups have been present in 
Morocco and Jordan way before the “Arab Spring” and their presence in the first 
place depends on the will of the monarchy. Furthermore, acquiring license to operate 
is a delicate process, and sometimes might not even be possible due to regime 
disapproval of the purpose of the organizations. All these cases reflect a civil society 
that was and still is dependent on the state itself for survival, which defies the purpose 
of having an independent body that checks the actions of the regime in defense of the 
people and their well being.  
In non-oil producing monarchies, the trend in dealing with controversial topics 
has become obvious, with the state reshaping and redefining certain concepts from a 
different light, while still maintaining the same attitude towards it. This can be seen 
through the position of the monarchies on human rights, where “the state has even 
becomes the major player, thereby defusing, to its advantage, critical aspects of the 
dialogue and stressing more acceptable aspects of education and culture”153. By 
allowing this to take place, the state would escape to a certain extent the blame for 
human rights abuses and allegations that the system itself fosters this violation in the 
first place. At the same time, no actual protection of human rights is evident and the 
issue gets diffused into trivial matters of blame. Since no real or cosmetic 
transformation took place after the “Arab Spring” regarding the containment of civil 
 
153 Sater, “State and Civil Society in Morocco”: 116. 
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society, then this point fails to be included in Heydemann’s system of upgraded 
authoritarianism.  
The final point is the one concerned with controlling new communication 
technologies. The Arab revolutions were signified by their extensive use of social 
media tools for citizen reporting, word spreading and mobilization; and this was also 
true of the two monarchies as well. Nonetheless, regime clampdown on the freedom 
of expression and freedom of press before the uprisings seemed to continue, if not 
actually regress after 2011. Journalists and bloggers were arrested in Morocco; news 
websites were shut down, with the raiding of their offices and monitoring of these 
online tools by the government continued. Fear of arrests and harassment by 
government-paid thugs caused many to remain self-censored and watch out for the 
material posted online. To top all that, topics that were taboo to mention or criticize 
remained so, specifically with regard to the monarchy, national security and religion. 
Though some topics that were frowned upon earlier became possible to talk about in 
Morocco, the general attitude remained the same with the consequences of living up 
to one’s own words on the internet. Freedom of expression continues to be limited 
through laws previously enacted, be it Press or Anti-Terrorism laws. This point 
further confirms that control techniques did not change with the development of new 
communication technologies, because the same repressive manner is still used to 
block any critical voices in the two countries. 
The above in-depth explanation to the application of the authoritarian 
upgrading model on the softening of the regimes in Morocco and Jordan clearly 
shows that since two of the five features reflect stagnant results after the “Arab 
Spring”, then this model fails to explain the survival of non-oil producing monarchies. 
While the first three points confirm the softening of authoritarianism, cosmetically 
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and temporarily to a great extent, it is still not enough to cover the whole requirements 
of the model proposed.  
The economic and political reforms implemented after 2011 could 
alternatively, and according to the results of the research, be explained by the 
continuation of the regimes in Morocco and Jordan to apply cosmetic reforms that 
address the symptoms of the disease rather than the problems from the roots.  
Speeches given by both monarchs, King Muhammad VI and King Abdullah II 
(refer to appendices), confirm that there is still lack of transparency between the 
monarchs and the people. In his Throne Day speech given last July, King Muhammad 
VI discussed the achievements that Morocco has been accomplishing in the past few 
years, with specific reference to political and economic advancements, as well as the 
preservation of human rights and different freedoms by the new constitution. 
However, many of these statements contradict the reality on the ground of what is 
actually taking place in the kingdom, especially with human rights violations and 
growing economic disparities in the country. The speech attached in the appendices is 
significant to examine because it highlights the rhetoric used by the Moroccan 
monarch, the topics he chooses to address the people with and the manner in which he 
approaches those themes, in an important event like the Throne Day.    
King Abdullah II on the other hand, has not made a statement since his 2011 
speech, in which he presented the constitutional changes to the Royal Committee on 
Constitutional Review. Although the king posted a video online congratulating the 
Jordanian people on the 68th memory of Independence Day this year, he has failed to 
follow-up with the people on the transformation that took place and the problems that 
the kingdom is still facing since then. King Abdullah’s 2011 speech to the 
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constitutional committee emphasizes the need to advance forward through a set 
roadmap, with certain political changes.  
Both speeches have almost the same rhetoric of the people and the regime 
rising together as a single unit for the development of the country as a whole. But note 
that even if changes mentioned in the speeches did take place, have the changes 
impacted core principles that control policies onward or have they only been 
superficial ones that appear to be leading democratization but in reality are just a 
temporary cover for authoritarianism. Those are only some pointers to see how 
monarchs attempt to answer their people’s inquiries and needs, without actually 
addressing the main problems holding the countries down. 
The next section will talk in more detail about the future challenges and 
threats that non-oil producing monarchies face, especially if they continue their 
‘democratic’ transformation in such a superficial manner.  
 
Future Challenges and Unforeseen Threats: 
 There are several economic and political elements that play a significant part 
in the survival of the Moroccan and Jordanian regimes. Implementing temporary 
reforms to calm the people in both countries was not an easy task, but it certainly 
would not get any easier, especially with the roots of the problems entrenched deep 
into the soil of the two states. Morocco’s Mohammed VI and Jordan’s Abdullah II 
both followed similar transformation paths without really altering the main problems 
in their states. The political elites that are protected and supported by the monarchies 
remain in charge of the imbalance that exists on all levels and these include: “acute 
rural poverty, rampant corruption, inadequate political rights and limitations on social 
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mobility”154. These problems have been present before the Arab uprisings; however 
their acuteness has been increasing since the events of the “Arab Spring”. 
 Since the demands of the opposition in Morocco and Jordan do not include an 
end to the monarchical system and the step down of the head of state, then the kings 
should focus on fixing the issues their countries face in a more direct and honest 
manner, to prevent demands from escalating to a boiling point. Instead of further 
focusing on the surface-level reforms, non-oil producing regimes should invest their 
effort and energy into addressing these problems. Radical changes will eventually 
trickle down to the rest of society; for example, tackling issues of corruption means 
reassessing the allocation of economic sources, which if sorted out, could be directed 
to more pressing issues like poverty, education and health. Eventually this will create 
and foster a healthy political environment for people to practice direct politics, where 
their demands are handled through true representation in parliament. This of course is 
not an easy process and much easier said than done; however, its durability is much 
longer than the pacifying reforms the regimes have to come up with at every dilemma 
they face. 
 The second point to note is the durability of the ‘traditional legitimacy’ aspect 
of the regimes’ survival. Both monarchs share similar religious backings for their rule 
and with Morocco’s long dynastic history155 and Jordan’s tribal support for the 
monarchy, the survival of their institutions can endure the popular pressures to a 
greater extent than republics. But that does not mean that traditional legitimacy on its 
own can be the sole alternative holding monarchies in place against people’s 
demands. If the Arab monarchies continue on the same level of performance on both a 
 
154 Zoltan Barany, “After the Arab Spring: Revolt and Resilience in the Arab Kingdoms,” Parameters 
89-101 43(2013): 100. 
155 Zoltan Barany, “Unrest and State Response in Arab Monarchies, “ Mediterranean Quarterly 5-38 
24(2013): 19. 
 80 
political and economic level, they will be facing harsher and more aggressive 
responses from their people. 
 Problems of poverty, unemployment, ill distribution of wealth, etc., are 
general problems that both Morocco and Jordan face in their fight to reform their 
countries. Yet, there are several challenges that each country is separately facing and 
leaving an impact on the economic and political liberalization processes. For Instance, 
Morocco has a rising problem of Islamist-secularist clashes. Over the past couple of 
months, there have been constant reports of incidents of clashes between the two, 
which reached its climax “in the April 24 killing by left-wing extremists of a student 
leader of Attajdid Tollabi (Student Renewal), a group close to the ruling Islamist 
Justice and Development Party”156.  
Though this particular issue does not directly impact the existence of the 
monarchy in itself, the inability of the regime to contain such cleavages hampers the 
political process altogether and reduces the chances of walking down a sustainable 
democratic path. Note that the Moroccan regime controls opposition through the 
divide and rule tactic; yet standing by and watching while such clashes happen or 
tipping off the balance in favor of one group over the other increases the possibility of 
things spinning out of control on a larger scale and eventually backfiring against the 
monarchy. 
The monarchy in Jordan has to also be careful because its situation is not just 
internal pressure from the people, but external pressure as well from neighboring 
states in conflict (Syria, Iraq and Palestine). Jordan’s geographical position places it at 
great proximity with these countries; this means any problems occurring abroad 
would automatically spill over to the kingdom. For instance, if the regime fails to 
 
156 Mohammed Masbah, “Islamist-Secularist Divisions in Morocco,” Sada Carnegie Endowment for 
International Peace, May 29, 2014. 
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contain unrest in Syria and the regime collapses, then the Islamist opposition in 
Jordan would consequently gain more momentum and have a more aggressive tone 
with the regime157.  
There are similar instances from Iraq and the recent developments with regard 
to the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) militant group, which is rapidly and 
effectively taking control over Iraqi territory, in an attempt to restore Islamic rule. 
Handling such threat, especially when the group claims intents to take over the Levant 
region, has to be among the priorities for the Jordanian monarchy. 
Both monarchies need to keep an eye on their internal and external situations 
if they need to ensure survival, yet being in control of the internal situation and 
investing in the people of the country makes all the much easier to fight off external 
threats. The next section offers future areas of research, which could benefit the 
monarchies’ development forward in a true economic and political reform process, 
and ensure internal stability of their institutions.   
 
Future Research Areas: 
 As deduced from the previous section, the only way to move forward in a 
productive and transparent manner is with the transformation of both political and 
economic elements together. One cannot make progress without the other and the 
ability of the regimes in Morocco and Jordan to make this combination work will 
definitely add to its survival rate. Future areas of resarch should focus on problem 
solving of obstacles, either internal or external, which have been threatening the 
development of monarchies. 
 
157 Marwan Muasher, “Reform in Jordan: After the Vote,” Carnegie Endowment for International 
Peace, January 28, 2013. 
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Political reform has to come in the form of actual laws and policies that add to 
the element of people’s representation rather than that of the king’s will alone. This 
means actual powers are given to parliament to enact decisions based on the demands 
of the people that elect them158. Having a functioning parliament will increase the 
trust of the people in the regime, as they will regain faith in the political process and 
concurrently seek changes within the system, rather than informally through street 
politics. To be able to have a representative parliament, many electoral laws that 
ensure a biased and unfair voting system have to be revised and eliminated as well. 
This way, true free and fair elections can enter into play. If future research emphasizes 
on the significance of a strong parliamentarian representative system of governance as 
means to alleviate political pressure, then statesmen can benefit from the results of the 
research to advance politically within a legitimate framework. 
As mentioned earlier, political reform alone cannot take the monarchies 
forward, this is why a modified economic plan, which deals with the rising problems 
of dependency on Western institutions, foreign, and regional aid has to be formed. 
Instead of having corrupt systems where wealth distribution does not reach the 
majority of the population, regimes should tackle the origins of corruption and create 
opportunities to self-sustain themselves through a more steady-income based 
economy. Economic dependence on foreign, international or regional aid eventually 
all pour down to a single conclusion, dependence on others is inevitable. Future 
research in this area can focus on the possible alternatives that the countries should be 
following to cut down on foreign aid and invest more in local talents, startup 




Economics and politics are terms that are difficult to separate in terms of 
impact of one on the other. Tackling problems in the former consequently has results 
on the latter and vice versa. This is why it is significant to combine the results of 
future research on both, to be able to make further suggestions and encourage local 
initiatives that would enhance the situation in the countries without the need to offer 
temporary fixes for the problems. 
Corruption, as stated above, has fostered an enviornment of favoritism and 
unequal opportunities in many cases. Solving the problems of corruption, not only its 
symptoms, will take both monarchies a longer way;  new laws regulating this matter 
“will make it more difficult for corrupt practices to happen in the first place and will 
provide an instititional check on abuses when they do occur”159. When the people see 
a genuine will by monarchies to invest in their countries and those who actually 
deserve it, then their whole attitude will be one of respect rather than intimidation, one 
of will to advance forward alongside the moanrchies rather than in deficance to it.  
The study of demographic composition of the population and the impact it has 
on the internal politics of the country is also a very important topic to be researched, 
especially on the second and third generations raised up in the kingdom. This issue is 
particularly important for Jordan, with the majority already Palestinian population and 
the on-going influx of Syrian, Iraqi and other Palestinian refugess into the country. 
Aside from the political and economic dilemmas that the kingdom and the refugees 
suffer from, and which are often highlighted in security studies, social aspects also 
need to be examined to see how intermarriages for example tilt the balance of social 
clusters, and what that could possibly mean for the status of the country at large. 




group is going to be a hard issue to limit and at some point, questions of who makes 
up the Jordanian population and what rights they have will be raised fiercly160. 
Non-oil producing monarchies might have survived the wave of revolutions of 
the “Arab Spring”, but the challenges those revolutions brought along will be harder 
to deal with in the long run, if Morocco and Jordan choose the path of cosmetic 
reform. The anticipation of their people for change, the escalation of the situation with 
unmet demands and further neglection of the majority’s needs will all boil down and 












160 Sarah Tobin, “Jordan’s Arab Spring: The Middle Class and Anti-Revolution,” Middle East Policy 
96-109 19(2012): 97.  
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Appendix A: King Muhammad VI’s speech on Throne Day 30 July, 2014 
   "Praise be to God. May peace and blessings be upon  the Prophet, His Kith and Kin 
   Dear Citizens, 
   Today, we are proudly celebrating the fifteenth anniversary of my accession to the 
glorious Alawite throne. This annual celebration is ran opportunity for us to ponder on 
the state of the nation. 
   I do not want this to be merely a time when we take stock of achievements. 
However significant they may be, they will always fall short of the ambitions I 
nurture for my loyal citizens. 
   I would rather this celebration were an occasion to pause and reflect, in all sincerity 
and objectivity, on the positive as well as the negative aspects of our action in order to 
move forward confidently and resolutely. 
   I am not only interested in achievements, but also and above all in the actual, 
qualitative direct impact our accomplishments have had in terms of improving the 
living conditions of all Moroccans. 
 Whereas it is, indeed, natural for a person to pause every now and then to determine 
where he or she is going, such an exercise is even more important for the nation’s first 
servant, who is responsible for more than 35 million people. 
   Considering the sacred mission with which I am entrusted as the King of all 
Moroccans, each day and every step of the way, I consult others and give due 
consideration to matters before making any decision that has a bearing on the nation 
or the citizens. 
   Are we making the right choices? What things need to be speeded up? What others 
should to be reconsidered? What major projects and reforms ought to be launched? 
   If a person thinks that he or she is always right, or that he or she does not make 
mistakes, then surely this will be a recipe for conceit and erring. 
   For this reason, I believe we must all ask ourselves: Have the accomplishments and 
the real progress made had the desired, direct impact on Moroccans’ living 
conditions? Does the Moroccan citizen - irrespective of income, social status or place 
of residence, whether in urban or rural areas - feel that he or she is indeed better off as 
a result of the major projects implemented and the reforms introduced. 
    By asking such questions, our aim is, in fact, to constantly improve efficiency and 
find the best ways to enable all Moroccans to benefit from achievements on an equal 
footing. 
   However, the fact that we ask questions and pause does not mean we are hesitant or 
unsure, or that we have no clear vision. On the contrary, the way forward is crystal 
clear, and our choices are well thought-out. We know who we are, what we want and 
where we are going. 
   Dear Citizens, 
    By assessing the state of the nation, we can gauge the progress made, using all 
standard mechanisms for that purpose. Back in 2005, we made a similar pause and 
came up with the 50-Year Report to take stock of the work done and pinpoint 
shortcomings for the post-independence period, and also to assess expectations. The 
aim of that exercise was to devise more effective public policies. 
    Today, fifteen years after my accession to the throne, I think it is important to 
pause, once again, as a nation.    Moroccan as well as foreign experts agree that 
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significant progress has been made in various areas in Morocco during this period. 
   Personally, I do not think anyone can deny that democratic achievements have been 
made. This is illustrated by the new Constitution adopted in 2011, by the freedoms 
and human rights system in force in the country and by the launching of the advanced 
regionalization project. However, the tangible impact of these and other reforms 
hinges on their actual implementation as much as on the elites that will give them 
concrete substance.  
   Nor can anyone deny that major infrastructure projects have been implemented. 
Could Moroccans - myself included - have imagined that their country would one day 
be home to the largest port in the Mediterranean? Or have the largest solar power 
plant in the world? Was it possible in the past for a citizen to take the freeway from 
Agadir to Tangiers, or from El Jadida to Oujda? 
   In the economic sphere, growth rates have increased significantly thanks to the 
adoption of ambitious sectoral plans, such as Morocco’s Green Plan and the 
Emergence Plan for industrial development, among others. 
    It should be noted that progress in the above areas has not been made at the expense 
of human development. Across the country, beneficiaries of human development 
programs have borne witness not only to these projects’ direct impact in terms of 
improving their living conditions,  but also to their role in fighting poverty, social 
exclusion and marginalization in our country. 
    The question remains: What use have we made of this progress? Has it merely 
contributed to higher levels of consumption, or have we used it to promote prosperity 
for all Moroccans? To what extent has this progress translated into better living 
conditions for the citizens? 
   Dear Citizens, 
   I think the Moroccan development model has reached such a level of maturity that it 
is possible for us to adopt advanced, precise standards to assess the effectiveness of 
public policies and determine the extent to which they have a tangible effect on the 
citizens’ lives. 
   This achievement has been confirmed by the World Bank, which indicated that 
Morocco’s total wealth has increased significantly in recent years, thanks in particular 
to the substantial growth of its intangible capital. 
   Intangible capital is one of the latest internationally agreed standards for measuring 
the total wealth of countries and companies. 
   As I am sure you know, there have been various changes in the standards used by 
economists and financial specialists to measure wealth. 
   The total wealth of states used to be measured in light of their natural resources, 
then on the basis of the gross domestic product, which, in turn, is indicative of the 
citizens’ standard of living. 
   Later on, human development indicators were adopted to determine levels of 
prosperity and the extent to which peoples benefit from the national wealth. During 
the 1990s, intangible capital became an essential constituent of wealth. In 2005, it was 
formally adopted by the World Bank as a standard benchmark. 
   Intangible capital refers to constituents of wealth that are not taken into account by 
conventional financial approaches.     The reference here is to the measurement of a 
country’s historical and cultural heritage, social and human capital, the confidence it 
inspires as well as stability, the quality of institutions, innovation and scientific 
research, cultural and artistic creativity, the quality of the environment and so on. 
   Security and stability, for instance, are the cornerstone of production and the 
creation of wealth. Similarly, trust and credibility are key ingredients to boost 
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investment. However, these assets are not visible in the total wealth of countries. 
    In 2005 and 2010, the World Bank carried out two studies to measure the total 
wealth of some 120 countries, including Morocco. Our country ranked among the top 
African nations, far ahead of some countries in the region. 
   Having perused the figures and statistics contained in the said studies, and which 
highlight the development of wealth in Morocco, I wonder, as do all Moroccans: 
Where is this wealth? Has it benefited all Moroccans or only some segments of 
society? 
   No in-depth analysis is really needed to answer these questions. While there has 
been significant progress in Morocco, the facts on the ground indicate that not all 
citizens have benefited from this wealth. During my field visits, I have noticed signs 
of poverty and vulnerability, as well as acute cases of social inequality.  
   Therefore, and in order to assess the situation properly and accurately, I call on the 
Economic, Social and Environmental Council to carry out a study of Morocco’s total 
wealth between 1999 and the end of 2013, in cooperation with the Moroccan Central 
Bank and the national institutions concerned, and in coordination with specialized 
international institutions. 
   The objective of the study is not only to highlight the value of our country’s 
intangible capital, but also to   make sure intangible capital is used as a key standard 
in the development of public policies, so that all Moroccans may benefit from their 
country’s wealth. 
    I hope this study will come up with an objective assessment of the situation as well 
as practical recommendations in this regard. 
    To make sure the study’s final report does not remain just words on paper, or a 
document merely for the media, I have decided that its findings should be widely 
disseminated. In this respect, I urge the government, parliament, all the institutions 
concerned and key players in society to study those constructive recommendations 
and seek to implement them. 
    Since the measurement of intangible wealth helps in decision-making, I want the 
census, which will be carried out this year to include all types of indicators relating to 
Morocco’s intangible capital. 
Dear Citizens, I attach as much importance to improving the citizens’ living 
conditions as I do to safeguarding their spiritual well-being and to consolidating the 
Moroccan model for the management of the religious domain. 
   Based on the Commandership of the Faithful as a frame of reference and on the 
Maliki rite, this distinct model is the result of the thorough reforms we have 
introduced over the last fifteen years to promote and revamp the religious domain. 
   This model aims to protect the citizen and society against extremism, reclusiveness 
and ignorance by protecting mosques from any kind of exploitation, making sure they 
remain places of worship, where guidance is provided and literacy promoted. 
    This is exactly what the 2008 Ulema Charter aims for. We have further 
consolidated that Charter by the "support plan" for local religious guidance, which I 
launched recently, and which is being implemented by more than 1,300 imams across 
the Kingdom. 
    The key element of this model is the provision of enlightened religious training that 
is grounded in the principles of moderation and that seeks to preserve our immutable 
Islamic values while promoting ijtihad and openness.  Through this approach, we are 
making sure our pristine faith is consistent with our national choices and the 
requirements of modern times. 
    For this reason, the Moroccan model for the management of religious affairs has 
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been commended both at African and international levels. 
    In this respect, we are keen to put the Moroccan experience at the disposal of sister 
nations that share Morocco’s commitment to the same spiritual values and principles, 
and that have expressed a desire to benefit from the Moroccan model in such areas of 
cooperation as the training of imams. 
Dear Citizens, 
   Given the consistency and harmony between our country’s domestic and foreign 
policies, I seek to make the most of our democratic development model to further 
enhance Morocco’s image and standing in the international arena, and defend its best 
interests as well as its just causes. 
    Considering the rapid changes affecting the world, I have sought to ensure that the 
Moroccan diplomatic approach is rooted in self-confidence, proactive thinking, 
realism and effectiveness. I have also seen to it that our policy is guided by a 
commitment to legitimacy, openness, moderation and respect for universal values.  
    This has made our country an effective, credible partner that is heeded and trusted. 
Working together with the dynamic actors in society, I have been keen to promote and 
consolidate our country’s standing at all levels. 
   As regards the Maghreb, I should like to say, once again, that I keenly look forward 
to seeing a strong union built on the firm foundation of solid bilateral relations and 
integrated economic projects. 
   I personally believe that disputes are not inevitable and that they are quite normal in 
all communities. Inside the European Union, for example, there have been 
disagreements between EU members, but the breaking point is hardly ever reached. 
What is regrettable in the Maghreb, however, is that a dispute is allowed to continue 
for the purpose of disrupting the evolution of the Maghreb Union. 
    Whatever the magnitude of the dispute, it should not, for instance, be used as a 
pretext for the continued closure of the borders. The situation is such that Maghreb 
citizens do not understand or accept such a state of affairs. Indeed, a number of people 
whom I met during my visits to sister nations wondered - rather perplexed - about the 
reasons for the continued closure of the border and asked that barriers between our 
peoples be removed. 
    My answer to them has always been the same: for more than six years now, 
Morocco has been calling for a solution to this odd situation. However, the response 
to all of Morocco’s constructive initiatives has been a stubborn, systematic refusal 
which is not only inconsistent with the logic of history and legitimacy, but also out of 
step with our peoples’ natural entitlement to human interaction and economic 
exchange. 
    As I pointed out earlier, I am keen to ensure bilateral relations are the mainstay of 
the Maghreb Union. In this respect, I wish to say how satisfied I was with the positive 
outcome of the visit I paid recently to Tunisia, and how much I appreciated the 
hospitality and warm welcome extended to me, both by the noble Tunisian people as 
well as by their country’s representative institutions. I was most touched by that 
warmth. 
    I am convinced Tunisia will forge ahead along a peaceful path, consolidate the 
institution-based state and achieve development and prosperity for the Tunisian 
people. 
    As regards the Arab world, the catastrophic situation in which several Arab 
countries find themselves is, indeed, a matter of profound sadness and concern. 
   The crisis in both Syria and Iraq illustrates the seriousness of the situation the Arab 
world is facing today – a predicament which is fueled by the politics of exclusion and 
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sectarian strife. This situation compounds the humanitarian tragedy that has befallen 
the peoples of these two sister nations. 
    It is much more than just a regional crisis. This is a fertile breeding ground for the 
most violent forces of extremism and terror, which seriously threaten the security of 
our countries as well as global security and stability. 
    Today, more than ever, we need a comprehensive Arab order based on economic 
integration and political unity and cohesion to turn the Arab world into an influential 
geopolitical force in the international arena – a bloc which is capable of defending 
crucial Arab causes. 
    The brotherly bonds and mutual understanding between me and the leaders of the 
Gulf Cooperation Council Member States, and Morocco’ special partnership with 
these sister nations are a source of deep satisfaction. 
   Regarding the Palestinian issue, I reiterate my strong condemnation of the brutal 
Israeli aggression in the Gaza Strip.    As a sign of tangible solidarity with our 
Palestinian brothers and sisters in their ordeal, we were among the first to provide 
material aid to the victims of this aggression, putting Moroccan hospitals at the 
disposal of the wounded to alleviate their suffering in these critical circumstances. 
   I reiterate my support for all constructive international initiatives aimed at achieving 
a just and lasting peace on the basis of the two-state solution. 
    In keeping with our sacred mission to defend Al-Quds al-Sharif, the Al-Quds 
Committee, which I am honored to chair, adopted a series of sound recommendations 
during its 20th session, which was held in Marrakech. They back the peace 
negotiations and call for the protection of the cultural and spiritual character of Al-
Quds against the illegal Israeli violations. 
    During that same meeting, a five-year strategic plan of action for the Bayt Mal al-
Quds al-Sharif Agency was adopted with a view to providing support to vital sectors 
through well thought-out projects in terms of time frame and funding mechanisms. 
    To bolster the steadfastness of our Maqdissi brothers and sisters on their land, I am 
particularly keen to ensure the Agency keeps up its action on the ground, provides the 
inhabitants of Al-Quds with direct, tangible support and seeks to meet their pressing 
needs. 
Dear citizens, 
   I believe Africa is capable of revival. 
   Such an objective, however, will be attained only if Africa’s sons and daughters rely 
on their own capabilities. I wish, in this regard, to repeat what I said in Abidjan: 
Africa should learn to have faith in Africa. 
   I reiterate, in this respect, Morocco’s commitment to implementing a 
comprehensive, coherent policy towards African sister nations, based on the joint 
development of resources, more effective human development and greater economic 
cooperation. 
   This commitment is illustrated by the visits I have paid to several African sister 
countries, as well as by both the number and the nature of the agreements signed, 
which lay the groundwork for a distinct, efficient South-South partnership that I 
would like to see rooted in solidarity. 
   I also wish to reiterate my commitment to multipartite and triangular cooperation 
mechanisms in order to forge balanced, mutually beneficial partnerships with 
countries of the North. 
   Considering the growing security threats - particularly in the Sahel and Sahara 
region - I once again call for collective action to deal with terrorist groups, which find 
allies in separatist movements, human trafficking gangs and arms and drug dealers 
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because of their converging interests. These groups represent the most serious threat 
to regional and international security. 
    As Morocco naturally turns towards Africa, this does not mean it will do so at the 
expense of our country’s relations with its international partners. On the contrary, this 
policy will open up broader prospects for partnership between the North and the 
South. 
   In this regard, I do not perceive Morocco’s Advanced Status with the European 
Union as an end in itself, but rather as a milestone on the path towards strengthening 
the Morocco-EU partnership, which I would like to be balanced and equitable. 
   For this reason, Morocco is particularly keen to ensure the success of the current 
negotiations for a thorough and comprehensive free trade agreement with the EU to 
serve as a framework for even closer ties between Morocco and Europe, as well as for 
the integration of the Moroccan economy into European domestic markets. 
   As well as consolidating its special relations with the European bloc, Morocco seeks 
to diversify and expand its bilateral relations with EU members. 
   As regards Morocco’s historical relationship with the United States of America, I 
should like to reaffirm my commitment to consolidating the strategic partnership with 
the United States, particularly by devising new mechanisms to support and promote 
the free trade agreement and continue our strategic dialogue with that country. 
   During the meeting I had with President Obama last November, we managed to give 
strong impetus to our partnership. The results are starting to show, be it with respect 
to our bilateral relations, or the similarity of views regarding regional and 
international issues of common concern, especially those relating to development and 
security in Africa. 
   To further promote our open policy and diversify Morocco’s partnership relations, I 
am also keen to strengthen the Kingdom’s time-honored ties with both the Russian 
Federation and the Republic of China - countries that I look forward to visiting in the 
near future. 
   I am determined to ensure that the economic aspects of Morocco’s special strategic 
partnership with these two countries are further enhanced and promoted. 
Dear Citizens, 
   Thanks to the Kingdom’s sovereign, pragmatic foreign policy, we have managed to 
rejuvenate and revamp our diplomatic action.     Moreover, I have sought to ensure 
that all of the nation’s key actors are actively involved in defending our country’s best 
interests, particularly our territorial integrity, which remains our foremost priority. 
   As I have said time and again, the question of the Sahara is the cause of all 
Moroccans. This is a sacred responsibility for all of us. 
   In this regard, I call for greater vigilance and across-the-board mobilization. I also 
recommend that the necessary measures be taken to remain one step ahead of our 
opponents’ schemes.  Indeed, there is no room for wait-and-see attitudes, reliance on 
others or reactive behavior. 
   I also reaffirm my commitment to the autonomy initiative for our southern 
provinces. Once again, the Security Council, in its latest resolution, described that 
initiative as “serious and credible”. 
   In any case, we shall not put the region’s future at risk. That is why we shall carry 
on with development and modernization projects there, particularly through the 
implementation of the development model for our southern provinces. This model is 
based on a participatory approach, on good governance and on cohesive, 
multidimensional programs aimed at achieving integrated development. 
   Advanced regionalization will be introduced in all of the Kingdom’s regions, and 
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first and foremost in our southern provinces. Indeed, regionalization makes it possible 
to promote local specificities while enabling the regions’ populations to 
democratically manage their local affairs in a country that harmoniously brings its 
regions together. 
   Finally, I should like to pay tribute to our Royal Armed Forces, the Royal 
Gendarmerie, the National Security Forces, the local authorities, the Auxiliary Forces 
and the Emergency Services for their constant mobilization under my leadership to 
defend the nation’s territorial integrity and preserve its security and stability. 
   I also remember, with deep respect, my venerated grandfather and father, Their 
Majesties King Mohammed V and King Hassan II, as well as all the martyrs of the 
nation, who made great sacrifices for the glory and sovereignty of our country. May 
they all rest in peace. 
   As a tribute to their eternal memory, we shall carry on with development and 
modernization projects to ensure all our citizens - wherever they may be - enjoy a 
dignified life in a secure, safe and stable environment, God willing. 
   "My Lord, make this a City of Peace, and feed its people with fruits". True is the 
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Appendix B: King Abdullah II’s speech presenting constitutional amendments 14 
August 2011 
 
In the name of God, the Most Merciful, the Compassionate  Members of the Royal 
Committee on Constitutional Review, Ladies and gentlemen, 
Peace, God's mercy and blessings be upon you, 
Blessed be the souls of the noble Jordanians and the father of the Constitution, His 
Majesty the late King Talal, who wrote our great Constitution. 
The recommendations concerning provisions of our Constitution that have been 
presented here today to me is solid proof of Jordan's ability to revitalise itself and its 
legislation and approach the future with a vision of social and political reform, the 
foundation of which is wider public participation, the separation between the branches 
of government and a clear definition of the responsibilities of each of these branches 
in a manner that truly reflects the Hashemite tradition and good governance in state 
administration. I extend my thanks and appreciation to the president and members of 
the committee who carried out the constitutional review and suggested the 
amendments. 
In this context, we should point out the set of ideas and proposals presented by this 
respected committee, in whose experience and knowledge we trust. These suggested 
amendments maintain and enhance the balance among the powers though effective 
constitutional mechanisms. And because we believe in the protection of the 
Constitution that we have sworn to preserve, one of the major proposals is the 
establishment of a constitutional court to rule on the constitutionality of legislation 
and consolidate the judiciary's role as the authority that safeguards the 
constitutionality of legislation. 
At the same time, we also wish to highlight the new form of relationship between 
governments and Parliament in accordance with the proposals that ensure the balance 
between the government and the Lower House and by which the dissolution of the 
Lower House is tied to the immediate resignation of the government. The proposals 
also suggest that governments can no longer issue temporary laws except in times of 
war and natural catastrophes and in cases of financial expenditures that cannot be 
postponed. In addition, it is proposed that an independent national commission 
oversee parliamentary elections, while vesting in the judiciary the exclusive authority 
to look into electoral contestations and the trial of ministers. 
To reinforce the role of youth in public and parliamentary life, the minimum age of 
candidacy for the Lower House has been lowered to 25 years, and thus, activism 
within political parties, professional associations and unions becomes an integral part 
of our national political culture. By establishing such liberties in the Constitution, we 
hope to institutionalise citizen activism and effective public participation in the 
legislative process as well as the formation of governments so that we can move from 
a phase of sloganeering to opening channels of activism and real life engagement in 
political parties, unions or youth movements. We need to practice this within the 
framework of an institutionalised political process that respects the rotation of power 
through parliamentary governments and a modern election process in which political 
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parties compete on the basis of national platforms. 
It should also be emphasised here that our relentless endeavours to consolidate 
balance and equity between the authorities are conditional on people's willingness to 
join political parties that express themselves and their policies at the ballot box. These 
are the fundamentals of parliamentary democracies. 
With the completion of this step, we assert that the roadmap of political reform will be 
achieved within a timeframe that observes institutional processes and the existing 
constitutional channels, and no later than the fourth quarter of this year. 
Priority in terms of legislation at this stage will be given to the conclusion of 
constitutional amendments, the recommendations of which have been presented to 
you today. Amending the Constitution will proceed in accordance with the 
appropriate constitutional processes and within a timeframe we hope would not 
exceed one month and that gives the legislative branch the ability to proceed with the 
review and adoption of political legislation, namely the political parties and election 
laws, which will have passed through a process of preparation and drafting that 
reflects the popular will and national consensus. 
When these laws are endorsed, along with the municipalities and the teachers' 
association laws, Jordan will have accomplished most of the legislative infrastructure 
required for an institutional reform process that ensures an engagement of the 
grassroots, political parties and unions, Parliament and government that lives up to 
national ambitions and expectations. 
We have ordered this review of the Constitution’s provisions and some amendments 
thereto in the belief that it is my responsibility and duty towards my people in meeting 
their aspirations and for the good of the present and the future. What is needed now is 
that all powers and institutions, whether partisan, unionist or popular, engage and 
invest in this reform process in order to translate into action programmes. 
After the Municipalities Law is enacted, municipal elections must be held as soon as 
possible. 
Today, we present Jordanians, both our present and future generations, with these 
historic constitutional revisions and amendments which reflect the high level of 
political and legal maturity among Jordanians who are bracing for the centennial of 
their state; a state that was built on the values of freedom, unity and equality. 
Your blessed efforts have paid off, as they are reflected in the legacy of the 
grandfathers and fathers and the aspirations of the children who are heading 
confidently towards the future to build the New Jordan in the face of challenges and 
on the principles of justice and equality. We will realise that in words and in deeds, a 
genuine achievement that will be a source of pride for all. 
Finally, I pray that God Almighty keep Jordan a free, strong and safe country and give 
us the will and the strength to protect our country as a haven of freedom, justice and 
human dignity. 
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Peace, God's mercy and blessings be upon you.”162 
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